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Corporate Law and Social Risk
Stavros Gadinis*
Amelia Miazad**
Over a quarter of total assets under management are now invested in
socially responsible companies. This turn to sustainability has gained solid
ground over the last few years, earning the commitment of hundreds of CEOs
and dominating the global business agenda. This marks an astounding
repudiation of Wall Street’s get-rich-quick mentality, as well as a direct
challenge to corporate law’s reigning mantra of profit maximization above all.
But corporate law scholars are skeptical about the rise of sustainability. Some
scoff at companies’ promises to “do the right thing” as empty rhetoric. But
companies are revisiting core business practices and adjusting central
governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation, to reward
improvements in sustainability performance. For other theorists, directors and
officers beholden to shareholder primacy can opt for sustainability only as long
as it also maximizes profits. While doctrinally straightforward, this approach
is highly problematic in practice. The wide range of issues nurtured under the
sustainability movement—ranging from environment and climate, to diversity
and other workplace concerns, to privacy and supply chain management—do
not always lend themselves readily to a profit-maximizing logic and are often
costly in the short term.
We offer a new solution to this quandary. We argue that, through their
sustainability initiatives, companies are looking primarily for safeguards
against downside risks, and not simply for opportunities to increase their
profits. Social risk has proven highly destructive for corporate value even when
the company’s key failure is not violating laws, as the recent crises at Facebook
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and Uber demonstrate. Sustainability can help avoid such crises because it
provides corporate boards with input from stakeholders such as employees,
NGOs, local authorities, and regulatory agencies. These stakeholders are
uniquely placed to register the impact of company policies on the ground and
can communicate concerns early. Contrasting sustainability with compliance,
the only risk monitoring mechanism sanctioned in our laws, we note distinct
advantages. While compliance’s scope is tethered to legal violations,
sustainability encourages intervention even when laws have not caught up.
Compliance’s emphasis on detection and punishment distorts management’s
incentives and incites fears of retribution in stakeholders. Rather than dwelling
on the past, sustainability builds a new vision for the future hoping to inspire
and gain trust.
We base our account of sustainability on interviews and roundtable
discussions with over three hundred participants, including leading public and
private companies, large asset managers, investors and pension funds,
shareholder advisory firms, and sustainability standard setters and data
providers. Our conversations confirm that it was investors who pushed hard for
environmental and social initiatives, putting pressure on more reserved
managers and boards. We argue that investors’ support for sustainability is
precisely because it helps fight risks that are otherwise hard to diversify. Asset
managers, in particular, who own significant positions in every U.S. public
company, are exposed to industry-wide and market-wide risk and may suffer
externalities from a company’s reckless behavior.
While investors have been early supporters, CEOs and executives are
only recently opening up to sustainability, which continues to face some
resistance in corporate boardrooms. We argue that directors’ and officers’
unwillingness to address social risk is a manifestation of agency conflicts.
Averting crises is a thankless task, and boards have few incentives to undertake
action without external pressure. Moreover, the intractability of many
sustainability concerns, combined with management’s confidence in the
company’s success, leads to systematically downplaying social risk. But by
failing to establish an appropriate sustainability function, directors and
managers are unnecessarily exposing their shareholders to increased risk.
Boards should ensure that their company has a well-running sustainability
function with proper board oversight that reaches out to stakeholders relevant
to the company’s business. This governance reform, we conclude, is essential to
allow sustainability to reach its full potential.
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INTRODUCTION
Socially responsible investing has taken the corporate world by
storm. Funds invested according to a company’s environmental, social,
and governance (“ESG”) performance grew to a staggering $30 trillion
at the end of 2018.1 To put it simply, over a quarter of global assets
under management are now invested based on the company’s
environmental and social profile, not just its earnings.2 The flow of
investor money into ESG funds is growing exponentially.3 According to
a recent survey, eight in ten individual investors in the United States
are showing a personal interest in socially responsible investment, and
half of them have already invested accordingly.4 Among S&P 500
companies in the United States, 92% provide disclosures on ESG issues
and 78% issue a separate sustainability report.5

1.
See Michael Holder, Global Sustainable Investing Assets Surged to $30 Trillion in 2018,
GREENBIZ (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/global-sustainable-investing-assetssurged-30-trillion-2018 [https://perma.cc/3WVJ-6T82].
2.
See generally Deborah Burand & Anne Tucker, Legal Literature Review of Social
Entrepreneurship and Impact Investing (2007-2017): Doing Good by Doing Business, 11 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) (outlining current approaches to social entrepreneurship and calling
for greater exploration of legal issues surrounding it).
3.
See Jon Hale, Sustainable Investing Interest Translating Into Actual Investments,
MORNINGSTAR (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/952254/sustainableinvesting-interest-translating-into-actual-investments [https://perma.cc/7M5A-CDF7].
4.
See Sustainable Signals: Individual Investor Interest Driven by Impact, Conviction and
Choice, MORGAN STANLEY 1 (2019), https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/
msdotcom/infographics/sustainable-investing/Sustainable_Signals_Individual_Investor_White_
Paper_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU3E-HKGV].
5.
See Sol Kwon, State of Sustainability and Integrated Reporting 2018, INV. RESP. RES. CTR.
INST. 27 (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018SP-500-Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST2D-L2U4].
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These developments mark an extraordinary reversal from Wall
Street’s get-rich-quick mentality and the mantra dominating corporate
law theory for the last five decades. Milton Friedman argued that, as
agents for shareholders, managers should focus on improving
performance; spending shareholder wealth on social projects was
wasteful, if not self-aggrandizing.6 In Friedman’s conception,
corporations abide by social and moral values as far as these are
expressed through legislation and regulation, and they contribute
actively to society’s well-being through the tax code.7 Within these
boundaries, managers ought to use every available means to pursue
profit.8 Friedman’s argument was especially influential in part because
it assumed a legal mantle, perched as it were on the theory of agency.9
Over time, firm value has come to be identified with stock price, utilized
as a valid metric by CEO compensation committees and courts alike. 10
For the last half century, interpreting shareholder primacy as a
requirement to maximize profits has remained the reigning credo of the
corporate world. Prior challenges to this perspective, like the team
production theory of corporate law, often failed to gain mainstream
following.11 Similarly, corporate social responsibility projects mostly
promoted charitable initiatives, and thus remained peripheral to the
running of the company’s business.12
To understand why this time is different, one need only consider
the actors declaring their allegiance. Chief supporters include large
asset managers like BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, which
combine to control on average between 15% and 30% of every publicly

6.
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33.
7.
See id.
8.
See id.
9.
See id. As a starting point, Friedman views managers as agents tasked with achieving
shareholders’ goals. The shareholder’s goal is to produce returns from the capital they have
contributed—without the expectation of returns, shareholders would not have put their money at
the company’s disposal. Thus, maximizing returns becomes managers’ core mission. See id.; see
also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306–07 (1976) (arguing that the only
obligation corporations had was to increase profits for their owners, the shareholders).
10. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 264–65 (2017) (pointing out that, in order to measure
performance for governance purposes, companies treat shareholder welfare as equivalent to
market value, which is based on stock prices, and arguing that this is too narrow an interpretation
of shareholder welfare).
11. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that corporate law should consider the perspective of other
groups involved in corporations’ productive models and not focus exclusively on shareholders).
12. See infra Section II.A.
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traded company in the United States.13 Larry Fink, the CEO of
BlackRock, an investment behemoth with over $6 trillion under
management, averred in 2018 that the companies in which BlackRock
invests must “serve a social purpose.”14 Shareholders, he continued, are
just one of the constituencies that stand to benefit from companies,
which must also look to their employees, customers, and the
communities in which they operate.15 In 2019, Fink announced that
BlackRock will vote against board members in companies that are not
adequately managing their climate risk.16 Even the Business
Roundtable, a CEO group with a notoriously anti-regulatory stance that
had successfully blocked Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
initiatives on corporate governance, reversed course.17 In a statement
signed by 181 CEOs, including J.P. Morgan’s Jamie Dimon and Apple’s
Tim Cook, the CEOs recognized their companies’ commitment to all
their stakeholders and pledged to invest in their employees, deal
ethically with suppliers, and support their communities. Generating
value for shareholders was at the bottom of their commitments.18 The
countless press articles19 and commentary from major law firms20 in
13. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721,
734 (2019); see also Jill E. Fisch, Asaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 62–65 (2019).
14. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/S9QA-RMWY].
15. Id.
16. Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/6LP7-84AQ].
17. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporationto-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/V4HB-4B67] (“Since 1978,
Business Roundtable has periodically issued Principles of Corporate Governance. Each version of
the document issued since 1997 has endorsed principles of shareholder primacy – that corporations
exist principally to serve shareholders. With today’s announcement, the new Statement
supersedes previous statements and outlines a modern standard for corporate responsibility.”).
18. Id.
19. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Companies Under Pressure to Declare ‘Social Purpose,’
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7ba44ea8-c4f7-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9
[https://perma.cc/QG4M-NSA4]; Jena McGregor, Group of Top CEOs Says Maximizing
Shareholder Profits No Longer Can Be the Primary Goal of Corporations, WASH. POST (Aug. 19,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/lobbying-group-powerful-ceos-isrethinking-how-it-defines-corporations-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/8CNY-UARR]; Alan Murray,
America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation, FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://fortune.com/longform/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations-purpose/
[https://perma.cc/
FK3V-8HY9].
20. See Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Purpose, Stakeholders, ESG and
Sustainable Long-Term Investment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/24/purpose-stakeholders-esg-and-sustainable-long-terminvestment/ [https://perma.cc/VY46-63VF]; Rose Ors, Interview with Susan (Suz) Mac Cormac,
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response to the Business Roundtable’s statement confirm the immense
attention social issues have attracted. At the 2020 annual meeting of
the World Economic Forum in Davos, climate change dominated the
agenda.21 The ESG wave has managed to radically change the public
discourse on corporate conduct.
Words are cheap, of course.22 Some doubt whether investors and
companies will show the same dedication in bringing change on the
ground, and others worry that allegiance to sustainability’s rhetoric will
divert public attention from pernicious business practices that will
continue unabated.23 It is tempting to dismiss all this as puffery. In
practice, however, boards are adopting reforms that go to the heart of
corporate governance. To reorient management incentives towards
ESG, companies are introducing ESG improvements as a metric for
executive compensation across a range of industries, from consumer
giants Pepsi and Walmart, to tech behemoths Microsoft and Verizon,
and oil companies Chevron and Shell.24 Firms are creating
sustainability departments to staff initiatives and oversee reforms.25
ESG is refashioning the composition and operation of the board itself.
In a market-wide campaign, State Street announced that if corporate
boards do not include at least one woman, it will vote down the entire

CLIENTSMART: VOICES IN SUSTAINABILITY (Oct. 9, 2019), http://www.clientsmart.net/blog/voicesin-sustainability-interview-with-susan-suz-mac-cormac [https://perma.cc/2RTU-RA8M]; Neil
Whoriskey, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Outlaws of the Roundtable? Adopting a Long-term
Value Bylaw, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/24/outlaws-of-the-roundtable-adopting-a-long-termvalue-bylaw/ [https://perma.cc/67BB-4JCK].
21. See Stephen Fidler & Elena Cherney, Climate Change—and Ideas for Tackling It—
Dominated Davos, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-changeandideas-for-tackling-itdominated-davos-11579896026 [https://perma.cc/3ZQK-72KD].
22. See Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (manuscript at 46–47),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544978 [https://perma.cc/CXP9-6M9M] (pointing out that in states
with constituency statutes that explicitly allow boards to take into account the interests of
stakeholders, boards very rarely do so when negotiating acquisition agreements).
23. See Miriam A. Cherry & Judge F. Snierson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983 (2015) (arguing
that companies engage in corporate social responsibility only superficially); William S. Laufer,
Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003) (arguing that
the absence of external validation facilitates corporate posturing); David Caleb Mutua, Green
Bonds Get Rubber-Stamped as Investors Question the Label, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-07/green-bonds-get-rubber-stamped-asinvestors-question-the-label [https://perma.cc/2SXR-4CFF] (discussing investor skepticism of
“green” bonds and third-party investigations into whether funds are in fact used for
eco-friendly projects).
24. See infra Section I.B (noting that companies have started to pay salary premiums for
executives who successfully improve the company’s ESG).
25. See Section I.B (discussing the growing trend for companies to hire sustainability experts
and even create sustainability committees on their boards).
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nominating committee of the board.26 In annual meetings, ESG
shareholder proposals gain support not only from socially minded
pension funds, like CalPERS and the New York State Pension Fund, 27
but also from mainstream shareholder advisory firms, like ISS and
Glass Lewis.28 These governance reforms are necessary to oversee the
tremendous efforts that companies are devoting to environmental and
social causes. From paper straws29 to greenhouse gas emissions,30 from
privacy31 to diversity,32 and from local communities33 to global supply
chains,34 companies are implementing far-reaching initiatives.

26. See Andrea Vittorio & Jeff Green, State Street to Vote Against More Directors at MaleOnly Boards, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0927/state-street-to-vote-against-more-directors-at-male-only-boards
[https://perma.cc/56DEMD2U].
27. See Chris Butera, New York Comptroller Aims to Double Pension Plan’s ESG Funding,
CHIEF INV. OFFICER (June 10, 2019), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/new-york-comptroller-aimsdouble-pension-plans-esg-funding/ [https://perma.cc/FKK8-7QQU]; Randy Diamond, CalPERS
Puts ‘Laser-Like Focus’ on ESG, Board Diversity, and Executive Pay, CHIEF INV. OFFICER (Apr. 22,
2019),
https://www.ai-cio.com/news/calpers-puts-laser-like-focus-esg-board-diversity-executivepay/ [https://perma.cc/BM8V-43J8].
28. See David Bixby & Paul Hudson, Glass Lewis, ISS, and ESG, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 3, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/03/glass-lewis-iss-and-esg/
[https://perma.cc/G8LQ-VADQ].
29. See, e.g., Starbucks to Eliminate Plastic Straws Globally by 2020, STARBUCKS (July 9,
2018), https://stories.starbucks.com/press/2018/starbucks-to-eliminate-plastic-straws-globally-by2020/ [https://perma.cc/EX4W-B28A] (discussing Starbucks’s move to eliminate plastic straws in
favor of “recyclable strawless lid[s] and alternative-material straw options”).
30. See Fidler & Cherney, supra note 21 (noting that climate change “dominated” at the
World Economic Forum in January 2020).
31. See Dan Ennis, Mastercard Seeks Partners on Data Responsibility Standards,
BANKINGDIVE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/mastercard-seeks-partners-ondata-responsibility-standards/565811/ [https://perma.cc/9JGF-BSTX] (examining Mastercard’s
initiative to “promote data responsibility” by “recruit[ing] companies, educational institutions and
agencies to advance a dialogue on data ownership and protection”); see also Global Data
Responsibility Imperative, MASTERCARD (Oct. 2019),
https://www.mastercard.us/content/
dam/mccom/en-us/documents/global-data-responsibility-whitepaper-customer-10232019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8T8-H6LA] (“Innovation is critical to business success, but not at the expense
of the ethical use of data.”).
32. See Jeff Green, Goldman to Refuse IPOs If All Directors Are White, Straight Men,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-24/goldman-ruleadds-to-death-knell-of-the-all-white-male-board [https://perma.cc/S2ZV-EKLB] (“Wall Street's
biggest underwriter of initial public offerings in the U.S. will no longer take a company public in
the U.S. and Europe if it lacks a director who is either female or diverse.”).
33. See Kevin Fagan, Salesforce, Postmates Agree to Kick In for SF Homeless Services
Funding, Regardless of Court Fight, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
bayarea/article/Salesforce-Postmates-agree-to-kick-in-for-SF-14429554.php
[https://perma.cc/
SHV6-3CPP] (discussing Salesforce and Postmates’s commitment to let the city of San Francisco
keep funds collected from the companies under Proposition C, a ballot initiative to fund services
for the homeless, even if it is struck down).
34. See Peter Whoriskey, Chocolate Companies Ask for a Taste of Government Regulation,
WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2019, 1:05 PM CST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2019/12/31/chocolate-companies-ask-taste-government-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/
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But as sustainability has grown into a hard-to-ignore reality, so
have the challenges it poses for corporate law. The foundational
doctrine of shareholder primacy prohibits managers and directors from
prioritizing the interests of third parties above their own bottom lines.
Traditional carveouts from shareholder primacy, such as for charitable
donations,35 are too limited to accommodate sustainability, which often
calls on companies to redesign core business practices. Directors and
officers could point to the business judgment rule, which typically
grants them wide latitude to opt for the course of action they prefer, as
long as they are reasonably informed.36 Yet, this latitude is available
only to directors and officers that believe they are acting in the
shareholders’ best interests.37 Hence, we are at a doctrinal impasse. The
only remaining option is to confront the challenge head-on and explore
whether sustainability falls in line with shareholders’ interests.
Corporate law scholars and practitioners, who have long relied
on profit maximization as the normative guide for resolving agency
conflicts, are wary of widening the aperture in the board’s lens. For
some, there is only one possible solution to the puzzle: as shareholders’
fiduciaries, directors and officers can only undertake sustainability
initiatives if they are in line with maximizing profits. 38 ESG proponents
have long argued that companies can “do well by doing good,”39 pointing
to factors such as rising consumer demand for sustainable products and
innovation around cost-effective sustainable materials and production
methods. Yet, there are many ESG initiatives that do not readily fit
within the confines of profit maximization, such as large-scale
8DGC-XLBS] (discussing calls from major chocolate companies for regulations discouraging the
use of child labor on cocoa farms).
35. See John A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate Philanthropy,
60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 269–70 (2015).
36. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 107 (2004) (emphasizing the role of information flow for accountability); but see
Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, Corporate Law for Good People, 115 NW. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512377 [https://perma.cc/8UR3-ERF7]
(critiquing the business judgment rule from an ethics perspective).
37. See Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 107–08 (discussing the business judgement rule’s
broad shield from liability for directors and officers who purport to act in furtherance of
shareholders’ interests).
38. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 765–66 (2015) (critiquing the views of “well-meaning commentators
. . . [who] ignore certain structural features of corporation law” to argue that officers and
directors can put any ends on par with or ahead of “the economic well-being of the corporation’s
stockholders”).
39. See generally Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial
Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN.
& INV. 210, 226 (2015) (making “the business case for ESG investing” based on a study that
indicates a positive correlation between ESG and corporate financial performance).
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workplace efforts to eliminate the gender pay gap. Overstretching the
logic of profit maximization to fit these initiatives not only threatens its
consistency and enforceability, but it also masks the real motivations
that directors and officers have for promoting them. In the hopes of
avoiding the hard line of profit maximization, another group has
defended sustainability as catering to the interests of shareholders in
the “long term.”40 But it is hard to specify how the long term is going to
be different from today, how sustainability’s benefits will arise, or why
more time is required. Allowing the board to utilize such broad
justifications for costly and controversial choices could dismantle
the lines of accountability that fiduciary duty case law has so
judiciously built.
In this Article, we offer a new resolution to the foundational
mismatch between shareholder primacy and ESG, building a novel
theoretical framework for boards’ social outreach based on an extensive
account of how companies are using ESG on the ground. We argue that
ESG serves shareholders’ interests, not because of its upside potential
to increase profits, but because it helps companies identify and manage
social risks to their business. Social risks arise when a company makes
a business choice that exemplifies, epitomizes, or overlooks challenges
rattling large societal groups, whole areas of economic activity, or even
society as a whole. Core ESG issues such as privacy, climate change, or
diversity, though arising out of sweeping technological advances or
large-scale societal changes, also implicate individual company
decisions. Management’s wrongheaded choices on these issues have
sparked corporate crises like those at Facebook41 and Uber,42 which
have had a profound impact on shareholders. Managers and directors
keep falling into such missteps because they are not well-positioned to

40. See Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment:
Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905, 906 (2010) (“[B]oard short-termism also
seems to be due to some investors with short investment horizons who use activism to influence
boards to make decisions that yield short-term returns despite the longer-term impairing effects
those decisions might have on the corporate enterprise.”); see also Virginia Harper Ho, RiskRelated Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 696–
97 (2016) (advocating for regulation that accounts for the long-term sustainability of the company).
41. See Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html
[https://perma.cc/VH8Y-SDLV] (discussing the Cambridge Analytica data breach and the ensuing
scandal and fallout that plagued Facebook as a result).
42. See Mike Isaac, Uber Embraces Major Reforms as Travis Kalanick, the C.E.O., Steps
Away, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber-traviskalanick-holder-report.html [https://perma.cc/U88Z-RK3J] (discussing Uber’s “attempt to repair
its reputation over a series of scandals stemming from its bad-boy culture,” which included the
resignation of CEO Travis Kalanick and a “sweeping reorganization”).
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understand the impact of their choices on third parties, focused as they
are on the company’s bottom line.
ESG remedies gaps in boards’ understanding of social risk by
turning directly to potentially impacted third parties in order to source
information about the consequences of company practices. Stakeholders
such as employees, citizens’ groups and NGOs, scientific experts, and
government authorities are uniquely sensitive to the implications of
board choices on their constituencies and ideally placed to register
potential concerns.43 Although traditionally thought of as managers’
adversaries, these stakeholders know the company intimately and can
provide the board with specific feedback it would have trouble obtaining
through more established information avenues, such as the firm’s own
hierarchy, as we show below. Understood this way, ESG is not a
utopian, quixotic effort to turn altruism into profitmaking, but a
business strategy designed to protect shareholders from downside risk,
which represents a potential reversal of positive returns and decline in
value. Viewed as shielding company assets from negative impact, ESG
has little trouble fitting squarely with shareholder primacy.
Our Article is the first to claim that ESG has an informational
function that can address deficiencies in board oversight long bemoaned
in the industry and the legal literature alike. Most directors in U.S.
public companies are themselves very anxious about their boards’
inability to grasp disruptive and unanticipated risks. 44 Leading
corporate law scholars are recommending radical governance changes
to address this deficiency, such as recruiting a separate class of high
powered directors with a strengthened oversight role.45 Others argue
for expanding the board’s compliance obligations with a forwardlooking mandate,46 or question the distinction between legal and
nonlegal risk, which limits compliance’s reach under Delaware law.47
43. See infra Section III.B (examining the ways in which corporate commitments to
sustainability builds trust among key groups of stakeholders and helps eliminate uncertainties).
44. See NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRS., ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE: BOARD OVERSIGHT FOR DISRUPTIVE
RISKS
10–12
(2018),
http://boardleadership.nacdonline.org/rs/815-YTL-682/images/
NACD%20BRC%20Adaptive%20Governance%20Board%20Oversight%20of%20Disruptive%20Ri
sks.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6KE-TDQR].
45. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351,
353–55 (2019) (“Our goal is to frame a board model composed of a workable number of thickly
informed, well-resourced, and highly motivated directors who could credibly monitor managerial
strategy and operational skill in cases where this would be particularly valuable.”).
46. Under Delaware law, corporate boards have an obligation to monitor their employees’
observance of legal obligations. See infra Section II.A. See also John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon &
Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2020) (arguing for
strengthening director liability for compliance failures, including compensation clawbacks).
47. See generally Frank Partnoy, Delaware and Financial Risk, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 130 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall
S. Thomas eds., 2018) (arguing that Delaware laws already cover financial risk); see also Elizabeth
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Finally, some are even calling for placing employee representatives on
corporate boards, an unprecedented move in American capitalism.48 We
respond to these calls by showing that companies have turned to ESG
in order to improve their risk oversight, particularly from a social or
ethical standpoint, because ESG offers distinct advantages to other
established corporate monitoring mechanisms, such as compliance.49
We base our claim that risk management is ESG’s primary
mission on an extensive account of current ESG practices on the
ground, developed after a series of interviews and roundtable
discussions with over three hundred participants.50 These include the
largest asset managers, such as BlackRock and State Street;
investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo; pension
funds, such as CalSTRS and CalPERS; proxy advisors, such as ISS and
Glass Lewis; hedge funds, such as JANA Partners; leading investors,
such as ValueAct; and sustainability advocacy NGOs, such as CERES.
We spoke with high-ranking executives from U.S. companies, such as
Clorox, Uber, Airbnb, Salesforce, Lyft, and Pepsi Co., and with standard
setters, such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(“SASB”). Despite their vastly different industries and roles,
participants described the huge efforts that companies undertake in
order to canvass a critical mass of stakeholders through extensive
surveys, town hall meetings, and face-to-face negotiations. After
reaching far and wide, companies utilize this information to determine
areas of interest and shape appropriately targeted initiatives. This
process-based deduction alleviates fears that companies are arbitrarily
promoting whatever values are in vogue at the moment or whatever
mission is management’s pet peeve.
We develop our argument in five parts below. Part I highlights
that introducing social considerations into core business decisions is an
extraordinary shift for companies.51 Prior efforts to reconcile this new
direction with the conventional understanding of corporate law’s
orientation toward profitmaking leave much to be desired. Part II

Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2017 (2019) (“[D]rawing
a line between business and legal risk is debatable from a social welfare perspective . . . .”).
48. See Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in
Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 697 (2019) (arguing for co-determination and worker
representation on boards); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 5
(Univ. Pa. Inst. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-39), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461924
[https://perma.cc/6QAE-FEK5] (arguing that boards should establish a separate
workforce committee).
49. See infra Parts III & IV.
50. See infra Appendix A. Insights from these conversations are throughout the Article,
attributing statements to participants only with their consent.
51. See infra Part I.
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provides the main evidence that ESG’s real function in modern
corporations is to manage risk.52 We illustrate ESG’s strengths by
comparing it to the only other risk monitoring system law has
previously required companies to develop: their compliance operations.
We argue that the scope of issues highlighted by sustainability is much
wider than the violations that compliance targets. Because of its focus
on legal risk, compliance is backwards-looking and remains tethered to
statutory and regulatory definitions of appropriate conduct, harm, and
liability. In contrast, the stakeholders that populate ESG’s information
gathering efforts focus on negative developments on the ground,
regardless of whether they are punishable by law. For example, many
companies who commit to sustainability tend to ratchet up their
product or service standards far above the minimum level required by
law.53 Similarly, sustainability pushes companies to think about
concerns that might be currently unregulated but invoke values that
law often protects.54
Part III argues that, in addition to a wider set of issues, ESG
also utilizes more effective tools for eliciting information.55 Compliance
puts employees and managers on the spot and threatens sanctions,
often leading supervisors to conceal or ignore misconduct. Instead,
sustainability offers a new, optimistic vision for the future without
lingering on the past, encouraging everyone to enter afresh into new
commitments. Thus, the well-documented agency conflicts that often
undermine compliance efforts are less pronounced in sustainability’s
case. Moreover, ESG initiatives, though often costly, manifest the
company’s credible commitment to stakeholders’ concerns, which helps
establish trust that can come in handy if risks materialize.
For all the advantages of stakeholder-oriented ESG as risk
monitor, one might still wonder why companies have only recently
started showing such concern about downside risks. To explain this
drastic shift in corporate attention, Part IV points to the rise of asset
managers as major shareholders in the United States over the last ten
years.56 Because of their contractual obligation to follow a
predetermined investment strategy, such as replicating an index or an
industry portfolio, asset managers cannot easily divest of troubled
stocks. These hurdles to liquidate, while not generally a cause of
concern in a large stock portfolio, make asset managers more

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.

3 - Gadinis & Miazad_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1414

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

[Vol. 73:5:1401

vulnerable to risks that are hard to diversify. The risks targeted by ESG
often fall into this category. A crisis in one corporation often heralds a
reckoning for the whole industry, which asset managers cannot easily
exclude from their portfolios. Moreover, asset managers are
particularly concerned about corporate externalities, which typically
hurt other companies that large asset managers are very likely to own.
In Part V, we argue that Delaware courts should recognize that,
by failing to build up their companies’ ESG function, directors and
officers are exposing their shareholders to increased risks. 57 If that
failure is due to bad faith, it should be treated as a violation of the duty
of loyalty. To clear the bad faith hurdle, boards should ensure that the
company has a well-established ESG function. This would consist of an
internal governance mechanism with adequate staff and resources, a
well-defined substantive scope, and, most importantly, a robust effort
for outreach to stakeholders. We do not propose a specific governance
framework; boards should be free to formulate their framework in a
manner that best integrates sustainability with their operations. But
we do argue that an internal governance reform is necessary to
transform stakeholder input into valuable corporate policy.
I. SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM IN CORPORATE LAW
A. Shareholder Primacy, For-Profit Character, and ESG
Despite trillions of dollars poured into ESG investments, a
decade of corporate soul searching, and a bevy of standard setters, one
would be hard-pressed to come up with a consistent definition for this
phenomenon. Environmental concerns are a key area of interest, but
they are only a subset of ESG’s wide scope. 58 Issues related to workplace
relationships, like gender equality and diversity;59 technology problems,
like privacy and cybersecurity;60 and supply chain challenges, like
57. See infra Part V.
58. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 15–16 (2018),
https://www.unpri.org/Uploads/g/f/c/priannualreport_605237.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4BL-HAUD]
(discussing examples of actions on climate change, water, human rights, and labor in the
garment industry).
59. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in
Corporate Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105 (2018) (exploring rationales for gender diversity in
corporate boards).
60. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2019, at 16–17 (2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/H5T8D9JM] (discussing technological instability, particularly with respect to data privacy, as one of five
areas of perceived major global risk); see also Owen Walker, Data Privacy: Tech’s ‘Dark Underbelly’
Bugs Responsible Investors, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/707fb606-91a5-
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humane work conditions, are now a mainstay of sustainability
initiatives.61 Moreover, ESG’s scope expands by the day with new
concerns vying for corporate attention, like the use of sugar in packaged
foods62 or children and screen time.63 This definitional ambiguousness
has given rise to a common misconception of ESG as a random and eversprawling assortment of objectives, influenced by fads and trends
rather than hard business logic. Scoffing at ESG’s multiple causes, we
argue, is akin to looking at the trees but missing the forest.
Instead, we show that ESG has evolved into a separate corporate
function, whose mission is to monitor and manage the risks facing the
company due to its environmental and social impact. Conceptualizing
ESG as a corporate function, one can easily see why its priorities vary
and evolve continuously. ESG’s focus adjusts to each company’s distinct
operations since each company impacts society in different ways. ESG
narrows down a company’s social risk by subjecting every aspect of its
operations to a test of moral rectitude and social equitableness. Rather
than frightfully open-ended, this process is, in fact, quite regimented
and relies on feedback from the company’s stakeholders, as we explore
below in Section II.A.64
As a corporate function, ESG shares a monitoring mission
alongside other departments such as internal controls, accounting, and
compliance. But while internal controls and accounting operate under
a rules-based framework defined by external actors in mandatory
terms, ESG represents an attempt by companies to self-regulate their
conduct. Terms like “corporate sustainability,” “environmental, social,
and governance” issues, and “triple bottom line” have been used widely,
and often interchangeably with preexisting concepts like “corporate
11e8-9609-3d3b945e78cf [https://perma.cc/CZU5-27L4] (“[D]ata privacy has become a crucial
metric when assessing the companies in which [many people] invest.”).
61. See Miguel Angel Jaimes-Valdez & Carlis Armando Jacobo-Hernandez, Sustainability
and Corporate Governance: Theoretical Development and Perspectives, 6 J. MGMT. &
SUSTAINABILITY 44, 48–50 (2016).
62. See, e.g., S&P G LOBAL, ESG INDUSTRY REPORT CARD: CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND
AGRIBUSINESS 2 (2019), https://www.spglobal.com/_media/documents/esg-industry-reportcard_consumer-products-and-agribusiness.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL4G-LTFC] (“Consumers are
increasingly focused on health and wellness, which has resulted in a loss of market share for some
categories of goods such as carbonated nonalcoholic beverages, beer, and cereal. This is partly due
to the additives, preservatives, sugar content, and chemicals . . . .”).
63. See Letter from Barry Rosenstein, Managing Partner, JANA Partners LLC, & Anne
Sheehan, Dir. of Corp. Governance, Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., to Bd. of Dirs., Apple Inc. (Jan.
6, 2018), https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/letter_from_jana_partners_and_calstrs_to_appl
e_inc._board_1.6.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GVT-CTSE] (writing that, as shareholders collectively
owning $2 billion in Apple stock, they “believe there is a clear need for Apple to offer parents more
choices and tools to help them ensure that young consumers are using your products in an
optimal manner”).
64.. See infra Section II.A.
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social responsibility.” Broadly speaking, these terms refer to voluntary
actions taken by a company to manage its own environmental and social
impacts. In this way, they are distinct from actions taken in response
to a legal or contractual obligation.
Such an approach to doing business is, at least seemingly, in a
collision course with fundamental tenets of corporate law, such as the
for-profit character of corporations and the principle of shareholder
primacy. The original expression of shareholder primacy is
conventionally thought to emanate from the century-old ruling in Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co.65 In Dodge, the court struck down management’s
decision to lower car prices because it was made ostensibly for social
purposes—namely, helping customers and creating job opportunities—
rather than the benefit of shareholders.66 Recent cases have continued
this thinking. In eBay Domestic Holdings Inc. v. Newmark, the court
ordered shareholders who saw the company’s intellectual property as a
free-for-all social good to either lift their objections to its monetization
or change their form of association.67 Delaware’s antitakeover
jurisprudence, the linchpin of its corporate law edifice, seeks to identify
the best option for shareholders above all else.68 Whether doing what is
best for shareholders would have grave social implications is not a
relevant consideration in this case law.69
Shareholder primacy looms large over corporate law not simply
as a landmark judicial principle, but also as a normative compass.
Conservative theorists, like Milton Friedman and Frank Easterbrook,
argue that shareholders hand over their money to a corporation because
they want to see their capital grow—not because they want to help build
a new community center, subsidize recyclable materials, or help with
whatever do-gooding mission the company chooses. 70 If shareholders
wanted to achieve any of these socially minded goals, the argument
goes, they could directly support the charity or NGO of their
preference.71 Thus, as agents for shareholders, managers and directors
ought to respect the shareholders’ wishes, as expressed in their
purchase of a share in a for-profit company.72 Deviation from
65. 170 N.W. 668, 684–85 (Mich. 1919).
66. Id.
67. 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
68. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
69. See Strine, supra note 38, at 763.
70. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 32; Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative
Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 347 (2015) (“Put simply, conservative corporate theory embraces the
notion that seeking profit for the stockholders is the only proper end.”).
71. Strine & Walter, supra note 70, at 351.
72. See id. at 348, 353.

3 - Gadinis & Miazad_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2020]

CORPORATE LAW & SOCIAL RISK

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

1417

shareholders’ wishes amounts to a violation of the fiduciary duties owed
to them. This shareholder-oriented understanding of corporate law has
dominated corporate thinking in the last half century, edging out
alternatives that prioritized the interests of other stakeholders.73 CEOs
have continuously pledged their allegiance, and press articles have
confirmed its hold.74 Even among academics, generally a quarrelsome
bunch, dissident theories have failed to gain traction.75
Viewed strictly from the perspective of profit maximization,
voluntarily expending corporate resources to achieve sustainable
outcomes is a cost to shareholders that might run afoul of boards’ and
managers’ duties. For business decisions that do not implicate selfinterest, including those favored by ESG, directors and officers rely on
the protection of the business judgment rule, which provides them with
wide latitude to make speculative choices.76 But the business judgment
rule comes with two important provisos. First, the board must prove
that it made a reasonable effort to be informed about the contours of
that decision,77 and second, the board ought to believe, in good faith,
that its choice is in the best interests of the company.78 Suppose that,
in the context of satisfying its duty to be informed, management
receives cost estimates confirming that the sustainable option is
significantly more expensive than its conventional, but otherwise
equivalent, alternative. It might be hard for managers to maintain in
good faith that they are acting in the best interests of the company if
they choose the expensive option because it is sustainable.79
Of course, good faith considerations have not prevented
corporations from making charitable donations to universities, local
communities, and other nonprofits.80 It has long been accepted that
73. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 441–42 (2001).
74. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Beyond the Bottom Line: Should Business Put Purpose
Before Profit?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a84647f8-0d0b-11e9-a3aa118c761d2745 [https://perma.cc/S849-LWEZ].
75. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. L. REV. 547, 592–99 (2003); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New
Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1926 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side
Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2007 (2013).
76. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M.
Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
629, 635 (2010).
79. Unless, of course, they are able to explain why the sustainable option is preferable despite
its higher price. For possible explanations, see infra Section I.C.
80. See ExxonMobil, Employees and Retirees Donate More than $50 million to U.S. Colleges
and
Universities,
EXXONMOBIL
(May
14,
2019),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/
news/newsroom/news-releases/2019/0514_exxonmobil-employees-and-retirees-donate-more-than-
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directors and officers do not violate their fiduciary duties by devoting
funds to a social cause, as long as the company explicitly states that it
expects some benefit to flow back to it, however indirectly.81 For
example, a company can donate to a university because it benefits from
an educated workforce. But while such a loose justification may be
sufficient for a small payout, it is doubtful whether it would carry the
same weight for a large company project that might involve a significant
part of its resources. In addition, there is a circular logic to this doctrine
since it still requires the company to point to an expected benefit to
itself, such as a reputational boost.82
Cornered by the limitations of charitable donations’
jurisprudence, the doctrinal directive for shareholder primacy, and the
normative weight of profit maximization, corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”) could only remain peripheral. CSR departments developed
mostly as an arm of the company’s public affairs operations, looking to
associate the company’s brand with worthy causes. 83 For that reason,
top management rarely engaged specifically with the company’s CSR
activities, and boards did not care to oversee them.84 Core business
strategy was outside of CSR’s ambit. In this conceptualization, CSR is
simply a more targeted way of conducting corporate philanthropy.
These doctrinal boundaries are too constricting for the ambitions of a
modern ESG function. Today, ESG aspires to transform key aspects of
company operations, from raw materials and energy sourcing to

50-million—to-us-colleges-and-universities [https://perma.cc/M9J8-3SYT]; Donald G. McNeil Jr.,
Gilead Will Donate Truvada to U.S. for H.I.V. Prevention, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/health/gilead-truvada-hiv-aids.html
[https://perma.cc/
4NSF-LL9J].
81. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (upholding a modest
donation by a corporation to a university as “a lawful exercise of the corporation's implied and
incidental powers . . . to insure and strengthen the society which gives them existence and the
means of aiding themselves and their fellow citizens”); see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61
(Del. 1991) (affirming the approval of a settlement for a charitable donation and relying on
Theodora’s test of reasonableness and the 5% limitation as “a helpful guide”); Theodora Holding
Corp. v Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that a corporate donation must be
“reasonable” and relying on the federal tax law’s deduction limitation of 5% of total income as a
test for reasonableness).
82. See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 62. The case law has not recognized long term risk mitigation as a
potential benefit of corporate philanthropy.
83. See generally Brian Hughes, Why Corporate Social Responsibility Is Essential for Brand
Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-corporate-socialresp_b_9282246 [https://perma.cc/2BLH-MKXK] (arguing in favor of implementing CSR strategies
and providing guidance about how to do so).
84. See Robert B. Hirth, Think You Know Sustainability? Think Again, NACD: BOARD TALK
(Feb.
27,
2019),
https://blog.nacdonline.org/posts/think-you-know-sustainability?_
ga=2.132694089.65468589.1565971427-693579900.1564765622 [https://perma.cc/6ETC-ALQL].
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packaging and distribution channels,85 from the company’s
relationship with its employees to its supply chain and third-party
providers.86 For ESG to enter the corporate mainstream, it has to
square with corporations’ for-profit character and the concept of
shareholder primacy.
B. ESG Is Not Just Empty Rhetoric
ESG is increasingly impacting foundational aspects of corporate
governance, from executive compensation to board composition.
Notwithstanding, skepticism has dogged the ESG movement from the
start. The intractability of problems like climate change makes ESG
commitments sound like hollow promises engineered by public relations
teams to claim the allure of good citizenship. Public statements of
support by key players, like Larry Fink or the Business Roundtable,
express vague allegiance to universal values, but do not commit the
author to any specific actions, nor do they have any legal implications.
It is easy to dismiss these sentiments as marketing ploys or, at most,
soft prodding. Contrast their influence with the doctrinal machinery
corporate law has built to keep managers responsive to shareholder
profit maximization, based on rewarding managers on the basis of
earnings. With managerial incentives focused on keeping profits up
until the end of the fiscal year, ESG’s place among the board’s priorities
is far from certain. It may gain the support of some well-meaning
executives, but it would lack a solid foundation to develop into a marketwide movement. More importantly, it would fail to transform companies
on the ground.
For that reason, the strongest indication of ESG’s strength as a
movement is evidence that companies are changing their incentive
structure and governance to incorporate ESG into executive
performance. Executive compensation reform looms large. As early as
2012, the Principles of Responsible Investment advocated for
introducing ESG-related criteria among the factors determining
executive bonuses.87 By 2018, a growing number of companies began
85. See Andrew J. Hoffman, The Next Phase of Business Sustainability, 16 STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. 35 (describing stages for integrating sustainability into business operations).
86. See id. at 38 (“[C]ompanies [are] fac[ing] increasing demands for data, for both internal
management and external validation, under the watchful eye of activists, investors, suppliers,
buyers, employees, and customers. The gathering and dissemination of such information can open
up new awareness of supply-chain risks and opportunities.”).
87. Stephan Hostettler, Raphael Lambin & Claudia Wuerstle, Pay-for-Sustainability: How to
Reflect ESG in Modern Compensation Systems, HCM INT’L 3 (May 2018),
https://www.oebu.ch/admin/data/files/section_asset/file_de/3314/201805_viewpoint_-_esg%
5B1%5D.pdf?lm=1540370871 [https://perma.cc/ND2F-D53Q].
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offering higher pay to executives who achieve ESG improvements,
including technology giants Microsoft88 and Intel89 and consumer good
companies Pepsi 90 and Walmart.91 Estimates for the number of
companies with ESG-based compensation criteria vary widely from 6%
to 32%,92 mostly because studies disagree on what factors to
characterize as ESG-related and, in particular, whether to include
compliance reforms among them.
The rapid pace of reform has taken executives by surprise. Just
two years ago, Shell was fending off pressure from shareholders to tie
executive compensation to carbon emissions reduction goals. Shell’s
general counsel even went so far as to state that it would be “foolhardy”
to expose the company to legal challenges,93 implying that introducing
factors other than stock performance into the compensation calculus
may be precluded by the shareholder primacy principle. By December
2018, Shell had become the first major extractive company to
incorporate a carbon emissions reduction measure into its executive
compensation,94 prompting similar moves by London-based BP and
France’s Total. Chevron recently became the first U.S. company to link
greenhouse gas emissions targets to compensation. To reduce its
methane intensity emissions by 20% to 25% by 2023, Chevron added

88. MICROSOFT, INC., 2019 PROXY STATEMENT 31–32 (2019), (discussing CEO’s performance
on culture, diversity, and inclusion as a determinant of their compensation award).
89. INTEL, INC., 2020 PROXY STATEMENT 78 (2020) (discussing specifically how ESG metrics
affect compensation decisions).
90. PEPSICO, INC., 2020 PROXY STATEMENT 44 (2020) (grouping sustainability performance in
a distinct “people and planet” category under a key determinant of executive compensation).
91. WALMART, INC., 2020 PROXY STATEMENT 51 (discussing the role of ESG criteria in pay
determination). See also OPENMIC, BREAKING THE MOLD: INVESTING IN RACIAL DIVERSITY IN TECH
31 (Feb. 2017), http://breakingthemold.openmic.org/OpenMIC_BreakingtheMold_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JN8-QVGC] (discussing diversity in pay decisions).
92. See, e.g., CERES, SYSTEMS RULE: HOW BOARD GOVERNANCE CAN DRIVE SUSTAINABILITY
PERFORMANCE
18–19
(2018),
https://www.niri.org/NIRI/media/NIRI/sampledocs/SystemsRule_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/99A2-Y2VK] (noting that 32% of companies tie executive
compensation to ESG targets but only 6% disclose those targets).
93. Ron Bousso, Shell CEO Says ‘Foolhardy’ to Set Carbon Reduction Targets, REUTERS (July
5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shell-carbon/shell-ceo-says-foolhardy-to-set-carbonreduction-targets-idUSKBN1JV0ZY [https://perma.cc/FKK9-9PP6].
94. See Joint Statement Between Institutional Investors on Behalf of Climate Action 100+ and
Royal Dutch Shell PLC (Shell), SHELL (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.shell.com/media/news-andmedia-releases/2018/joint-statement-between-institutional-investors-on-behalf-of-climate-actionand-shell.html [https://perma.cc/FG7C-DJNM] (“Shell acknowledges and agrees with the
importance attached by its investors to the issue of climate change, and also agrees that Shell’s
future success is contingent on its ability to effectively navigate the risks and the opportunities
presented by climate change.”).
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this goal to the incentive pay formula not only for its executives, but
also for forty-five thousand employees.95
Executive compensation is also incorporating diversity targets,
which are readily quantifiable. Some companies, like Verizon and
American Express,96 are linking executive compensation to specific
diversity targets, while others, like Uber,97 are keeping their proposed
formula confidential.98 These moves often lead to controversial changes,
as Google’s refusal to link its executives’ compensation to diversity
metrics has shown. Even after twenty thousand employees around the
world dramatically walked out in November 2018, focusing global
headlines on Google’s practices, the company refused to back down. 99
Although tying compensation to ESG is a relatively recent
phenomenon, social scientists are beginning to explore its effectiveness.
According to one large-scale observational study, companies that tie
executive compensation to ESG goals tend to show an increase in social
and environmental initiatives, a reduction in emissions, and an
increase in green innovations.100 Another study underscores the
importance of having specific and quantitative targets, which are more
easily set for climate and diversity as opposed to other ESG areas, such
as human rights.101 Anecdotally, the most promising changes seem to
come from companies that implement these specific targets and
scorecards and make them publicly available. At Pinterest, for example,
95. Greenhouse Gas Management: We’re Taking Steps to Manage Greenhouse Gases,
CHEVRON,
https://www.chevron.com/sustainability/environment/greenhouse-gas-management
(last visited July 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7M8D-9NWB].
96. See Andrea Vittorio, AmEx, Verizon Among Few S&P 500 Firms Tying CEO Pay to
Diversity, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 15 2018, 6:02 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
bulkprint?includeArticleIds=00000164-f6e1-d8c8-af7e-fee190500002&order=PostedDate&query=
AmEx,%20Verizon%20Among%20Few%20S%26P%20500%20Firms%20Tying%20CEO%20Pay%
20to%20Diversity [https://perma.cc/B22V-6C9N].
97. See Heather Clancy, How LinkedIn Embeds Diversity Goals Into Day-to-Day
Management, FORTUNE (Oct. 20, 2015, 7:00 AM CDT), https://fortune.com/2015/10/20/linkedincompensation-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/K5FS-9EAF]; see also O PENMIC, supra note 91, for
further reading on companies, including LinkedIn, that tie executive compensation to diversity.
98. Notably, Uber has also not disclosed its current numbers with respect to diversity, so it
is unclear where the baseline is. See Shannon Bond, Uber Ties Executive Bonuses to Diversity
Targets, FIN. TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/9a6fed76-a6b9-11e9-984cfac8325aaa04 [https://perma.cc/2S99-U6JV].
99. See Vibhuti Sharma & Paresh Dave, Alphabet Shareholders Reject Diversity Proposal
Backed by Employees, REUTERS (June 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-incagm/alphabet-shareholders-reject-diversity-proposal-backed-by-employees-idUSKCN1J22BS
[https://perma.cc/4SSU-6XD5].
100. See Caroline Flammer, Bryan Hong & Dylan Minor, Corporate Governance and the Rise
of Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility in Executive Compensation: Effectiveness and
Implications for Firm Outcomes, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1097, 1099 (2019).
101. See Karen Maas, Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive
Compensation Contribute to Corporate Social Performance?, 148 J. B US. ETHICS 573, 579
(2018).
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the hiring rates for underrepresented engineers rose by 8% the year
after it tied diversity goals to compensation and disclosed those metrics
to the public.102
These executive pay reforms anchor a broader effort to increase
the board’s role in overseeing and promoting ESG. An important
dimension of this effort is increasing director expertise in ESG issues.
Asset managers like BlackRock103 and State Street104 and pension funds
like CalPERS 105 are pushing for creating “climate-competent boards”
by recruiting directors with related backgrounds. In response to such
pressures, 17% of all public company boards now count at least one
environmental sustainability expert as a director, according to a recent
study.106 Even ExxonMobil capitulated and added atmospheric scientist
Susan Avery to its board in 2017.107 But the most drastic change in
board composition concerns gender representation. By 2019, women
held 27% of all board seats in the S&P 500, up from 17% in 2012. While
this is still a far cry from gender parity, there is significant momentum
behind this trend. According to a recent study, 45% of all new board
positions among the Russell 3000 were filled by women in 2019, up from

102. See David Cohen, Pinterest Updated Its Progress on Its 2017 Diversity Efforts, ADWEEK
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.adweek.com/digital/pinterest-diversity-2017/ [https://perma.cc/
N2RE-E9W5]; Candice Morgan, What We Learned from Improving Diversity Rates at Pinterest,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/what-we-learned-from-improvingdiversity-rates-at-pinterest [https://perma.cc/J7YA-GAL5]; Queenie Wong, Pinterest Sets Diversity
Goals, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/07/30/pinterest-sets-diversity-goalsfor-2016/ (last modified Dec. 16, 2016, 10:45 AM) [https://perma.cc/8MBC-ZP9W].
103. See
Investment
Stewardship:
Engagement
Priorities,
BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/investment-stewardship/voting-guidelinesreports-position-papers (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7TXK-XZ3Q#engagementpriorities] (“We expect boards to be fully engaged with management on the development and
implementation of the company’s strategy.”).
104. See Climate Change Risk Oversight Framework for Directors, ST. STREET GLOBAL
ADVISORS 1 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2018/06/climate-change-risk-oversight_jun%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UY6-587F]
(noting “investor expectations of board members on their responsibilities with regards to climate
change related matters at their companies”).
105. See Veena Ramani, Building Board Climate Competence to Drive Corporate Climate
Performance, CERES (June 12, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/building-boardclimate-competence-drive-corporate-climate-performance [https://perma.cc/R2R7-DVPK]. At the
same time, there is still a long way to go: about 39% of all public company boards have recognized
sustainability as a priority, suggesting that a good number of them have not gone as far as
recruiting an expert director. See CERES, supra note 92, at 15.
106. See CERES, supra note 92, at 16–17.
107. Randy Showstack, ExxonMobil Adds Climate Expert to Its Board, EOS (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://eos.org/articles/exxonmobil-adds-climate-expert-to-its-board
[https://perma.cc/Q98RLV27]; Julie Wokaty, Shareholders Welcome Appointment of Climate Expert to ExxonMobil Board,
INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.iccr.org/shareholders-welcomeappointment-climate-expert-exxonmobil-board [https://perma.cc/CF2K-HA3B].
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33% just one year prior in 2018.108 Very recently, another milestone
made headlines—there are no longer any all-male boards in the
S&P 500.109
Companies are also experimenting with governance structures
that keep the board informed about salient ESG issues and strengthen
its oversight of ESG. About 10% of U.S. public companies are opting for
creating a separate sustainability board committee, which can build
channels of communication with sustainability officers, encourage
proposals, and communicate concerns to the whole board.110 Others
warn that delegating this crucial function to a separate committee risks
creating a silo and prevents ESG risk oversight from being fully
embedded into the entire board’s strategy.111 As our interviews
revealed, some companies, such as Clorox, have opted to incorporate
ESG monitoring among the tasks of their most influential committees,
such as the nominating and governance committees, which typically
select directors and set the board’s agenda.112
With such reforms underway, ESG is moving beyond token
expressions of allegiance to changing how executives plan their strategy
and how boards are monitoring firms’ operations. The scale of these
reforms, which alter management incentives and expand the scope of
the board’s obligations, illustrates the level of commitment necessary to
achieve a change of direction for companies. Required to recalibrate
their internal governance in ESG’s image, companies hit upon the
108. 2019 U.S. Board Diversity Trends, ISS GOVERNANCE (May 31, 2019),
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/2019-us-board-diversity-trends/ [https://perma.cc/L4LRHV2J].
109. Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Last All-Male Board on the S&P 500 Is No Longer, WALL ST. J.
(July 24, 2019, 5:20 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-last-all-male-board-on-the-s-p-500is-no-longer-11564003203 [https://perma.cc/L6LL-8KA5].
110. See Lynn S. Paine, Sustainability in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.–Aug. 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/07/sustainability-in-the-boardroom [https://perma.cc/47G9-X5X4] (discussing
the benefits of sustainability committees on corporate boards).
111. See Veena Ramani, View From The Top: How Corporate Boards Can Engage on
Sustainability Performance, CERES 4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/
files/reports/2017-03/ceres_viewfromthetop.pdf [https://perma.cc/V48W-KBCP] (indicating that
embedding sustainability in discussions on strategy, risks, and incentives “is essential for ensuring
that sustainability is not considered in a silo”).
112. Telephone Interview with Laura Stein, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, The Clorox
Co. (Dec. 18, 2018). At Clorox, the Nominating and Governance Committee changed its name in
the last year to the “Nominating, Governance, and Corporate Responsibility Committee” and
amended its charter to include oversight of “corporate responsibility and sustainability, including
environmental, social and corporate governance matters.” The Clorox Company Board of Directors
Committee Charters, The CLOROX CO. (May 20, 2019), https://www.thecloroxcompany.com/whowe-are/corporate-governance/committee-charters/ [https://perma.cc/XPV7-UCA9]. Gap Inc., for
example, created a dedicated Governance and Sustainability Committee, which also includes the
Chair of the Compensation Committee and a member of the Audit and Finance Committee.
Governance, GAP INC., https://www.gapinc.com/content/gapinc/html/investors/governance.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/XBX3-XHT6].
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normative stumbling block of shareholder primacy, which asks
directors and officers to put shareholders’ interests first. At first glance,
shareholder and stakeholder interests clash. Below, we explore current
approaches to reconcile this clash.
C. Why “Doing Well by Doing Good” Is Not Enough
To find a way out of their doctrinal quagmire, sustainability
supporters came up with a new mantra. Companies, they claim, can “do
well by doing good.”113 If boards and managers choose the sustainable
option because they believe it is also going to lead to higher profits, then
there is no clash with shareholder primacy. To start, there is significant
consumer demand for sustainably grown or manufactured products.114
Moreover, the argument goes, companies faced with a significant cost
difference between the sustainable and conventional options often
choose instead to go back to the drawing board and innovate. If a
company finds an innovative and cost-effective way to employ the
sustainable option, it can succeed in a marketplace dominated by
competitors who employ conventional methods. 115 More broadly,
innovation in sustainable production can provide companies with an
edge over competitors if one accepts that, in the long term, all
competitors will be forced to move toward more sustainable production
methods.116 Conceptualized this way, sustainability is another
megatrend of our era, calling for businesses to adapt their production
methods just like they did in response to the technology revolution and
globalization in the 1980s.117

113. Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2835 (2014)
(quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFREY S. HARRISON, ANDREW C. WICKS, BIDHAN L. PARMAR &
SIMONE DE COLLE , STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART (2010) and Michael E. Porter &
Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV. 89 (Jan.-Feb. 2011)).
114. See Solitaire Townsend, 88% of Consumers Want You to Help Them Make a Difference,
FORBES (Nov. 21, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/solitairetownsend/
2018/11/21/consumers-want-you-to-help-them-make-a-difference [https://perma.cc/X3EP-NKX3]
(discussing demand for sustainable brands).
115. Cf. Mike Colias, GM, Volkswagen Say Goodbye to Hybrid Vehicles, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 12,
2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gm-volkswagen-say-goodbye-to-hybrid-vehicles11565602200 [https://perma.cc/J8EA-DQU4] (discussing GM’s decision to concentrate their
investment on fully electric cars in order to beat competitors focused on conventional hybrid cars).
116. See Deniz Gülsöken, The Future of Plastic Lies in its Reinvention as Bioplastics, FORBES
(Jan. 16, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/denizgulsoken/2019/01/16/the-future-ofplastic-lies-in-its-reinvention-as-bioplastics [https://perma.cc/EU49-XNCU] (explaining how
companies are introducing sustainable bioplastics to replace plastic use, a move partly driven by
a desire to meet consumer demand for environmentally sustainable materials).
117. See David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative, HARV. BUS. REV.
(May 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/05/the-sustainability-imperative [https://perma.cc/Z9HA-KQ5P].
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“Doing well by doing good” helps advance ESG from the
corporate philanthropy pigeonhole into a core-business mindset and has
shown great momentum, but has also faced significant challenges, both
doctrinally and normatively. From a fiduciary duty case law
perspective, boards can develop “green” features they believe
consumers like or invest in innovating their production without fear of
liability. Such decisions are oriented toward profitmaking and,
consequently, they neither threaten shareholder primacy nor raise
concerns about the good faith of directors and officers. But not all ESG
initiatives are directly visible to consumers, and there are many
industries that are not consumer-facing.118 Thus, relying on consumer
preferences to justify ESG can only get one so far. In addition, while
ESG has been a driver for innovation, it also includes many initiatives
where no innovation is involved. For example, many workplace-related
ESG goals, such as gender pay equity, strive to change long-established
practices.119 Thus, “doing well by doing good” can plug some doctrinal
holes, but does not rise to an all-encompassing justification for ESG. To
overcome the doctrinal limitations, policymakers and scholars are
exploring alternative business forms that are better suited to pursuing
social goals.120
The normative front proves even more disappointing for the
doing-well-by-doing-gooders. To start, it is easy to recast “doing well by
doing good” as a prohibition, demanding companies to engage in ESG
only to the extent that there is a solid case for increasing profits. This
could prove constricting for boards, which might have to drop ESG
initiatives if they cannot justify them adequately. Even if one accepts
that ESG can help boost sales to like-minded consumers or cut costs due
to innovation, it still represents just one among many means to get to
the desired outcome. Directors and officers can opt for any other
strategy they choose, even some that are in direct conflict with ESG
goals. Due to its optional character, ESG could not develop the
normative pull necessary to counterweigh the single-minded pursuit of
118. For example, chemicals or machinery companies do not interact with consumers. The
Global Industry Classification Standard, developed by S&P and MSCI, divides companies into
groups, distinguishing chemical and machinery companies from consumer companies. S&P GLOB.
& MCSI, GLOBAL I NDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION STANDARD 6 (2018), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/documents/112727-gics-mapbook_2018_v3_letter_digitalspreads.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NW2X-7Y2M].
119. See CERES, TURNING POINT: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES ROADMAP FOR
SUSTAINABILITY
33
(2018),
https://www.ceres.org/resources/roadmap-for-sustainability
[https://perma.cc/9UXD-H64U] (discussing the trend of investors pushing companies to commit to
equal pay for equal work).
120 See Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937
(2020) (discussing existing hybrid forms, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses, and proposing
an alternative form).
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profit to which the corporate world had long subscribed. As often
reiterated in our interviews with managers and shareholders, ESG
proponents who argued for doing-well-by-doing-good did not manage to
get a wave of conversions to their cause.
In Part III below, we develop a different business case for the
role that ESG plays in modern corporations. Its mission, we claim, is to
identify risks that, though emanating from a social or moral core, can
lead the company into deep financial trouble, hurting its earnings and
stock price performance. Understanding ESG as an exercise in risk
mitigation, as we propose, offers an overarching theory that can
accommodate different sustainability initiatives across industries
without resorting to current trends in consumer preferences,
technology, or business operations.
II. ESG HELPS MITIGATE SOCIAL RISK
THROUGH STAKEHOLDER INFORMATION
At first glance, sustainability may strike one as an unexpected
choice for protecting a company against downside risk. Most people
view sustainability as an effort to ensure that company decisions are in
line with certain social or moral values. But, we argue, by
operationalizing their commitment to these values, companies are also
seeking to avert the reputational uproar, stock price drop, and legal
troubles following misconduct. The outcomes visible to employees,
shareholders, and the public are simply the end result of an extensive
effort to identify areas of concern for the company and improve
its performance.
The values that ESG promotes do not originate from an abstract
moralistic philosophy of “doing the right thing,” nor are they dictated
by a central standard setter, as is common with other industry selfregulatory efforts. Rather, they arise following a wide-ranging
consultation with stakeholders, who are better positioned to take notice
of potentially catastrophic company operations, as we show below. 121
Through this outward-looking process, ESG introduces new
perspectives into the company’s decisionmaking in order to allow
management to form a better understanding of the full impact of its
decisions. At the same time, this process is iterative, allowing the
company to interact and negotiate with stakeholders directly. The
broader the circle of stakeholders participating in the company’s ESG
outreach, the more representative its outcome will be, communicating
the main concerns of the third parties most closely associated with or
121. See infra Section III.B.
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affected by company operations. What solidifies ESG is not unity of
subject matter, but the common process of consulting stakeholders and
operationalizing this feedback into achievable and measurable goals for
the company. Thus, sustainability takes two viewpoints traditionally
seen as antithetical by corporate law theorists—the shareholder
perspective and the stakeholder perspective—and merges them into one
coherent approach.
In this Part, as well as Part III below, we develop our argument
that ESG gathers information from stakeholders to help companies
mitigate risks. We start by situating ESG as an effort by companies to
self-regulate their conduct, and compare it to compliance, the only other
corporate function ensconced by law to rein in corporate misconduct.
We first explain why these two functions are comparable, and then
explain why ESG is more effective as a tool for risk mitigation compared
to compliance. In Section II.A, we argue that ESG has a wider scope
than compliance, providing the board with information about problems
that might not have otherwise reached it in time. In Section II.B, we
show that, even when compliance and ESG target the same value, such
as gender in the workforce, ESG’s aperture is much wider. In Section
II.C, we show how ESG can flag problems with company practices
before the law instigates a formal prohibition. In Part III, we argue that
ESG encourages stakeholders to share information with management
rather than withhold it.
A. Law-Driven Compliance Compared to Stakeholder-Driven
Sustainability: An Overview
Before the arrival of ESG, risk mitigation played a very limited
role in corporate governance. Instead of constraining risk-taking,
corporate doctrine is designed to encourage it, offering tools like entity
partitioning or shielding management under the business judgment
rule if investments turn sour. 122 As the conventional saying goes, the
higher the risk, the higher the return.123 Well aware of the need to curb
corporate
risk-taking,
policymakers
have enacted
various
regulations.124 As companies developed into huge organizations with

122. See David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and
the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 217–19 (2009) (discussing corporate risktaking in the context of the business judgment rule).
123. See id. at 221 (“When a corporation embarks on a risky venture, its leaders will likely
justify the action on the grounds that, although the likelihood of failure is high, the venture will
greatly benefit the corporation and its shareholders if it is successful.”).
124. For examples of regulations, see Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (2012), which ensures work environments free of hazards, and Fair Packaging and
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hundreds or thousands of employees, however, ascertaining liability for
legal violations became increasingly difficult.125
Struggling with the dynamics of corporate hierarchies,
enforcement authorities like the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) pushed
for the development of corporate compliance and an internal corporate
department monitoring other employees. 126 Typical compliance
methods include a corporate rulebook, monitoring processes, and
employee training programs.127 Over time, compliance became an
essential part of laws passed in the wake of severe corporate
misconduct, like Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, and national crises,
like 9/11. Today, compliance departments in large corporations count
hundreds of staff and report to the chief legal counsel or cooperate
closely with her.128
Since compliance’s chief mission is to ensure that employees
abide by the law, its goals, rules, and guidance mirror statutory
mandates and agency rules. Heavily regulated areas, like money
laundering, corruption, pollution, and intellectual property are primary
compliance concerns.129 Under Delaware law, the board has a duty to
ensure that the company has an adequate compliance system and that
it responds appropriately to any red flags about ongoing violations by
employees.130 Once red flags reach the board, it must investigate and
penalize or fire involved employees.131 Overall, by deterring employees

Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (2012), which prevents deceptive packaging or labeling of
consumer products.
125. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 2135, 2147 (2019) (noting that a “proliferation of new [federal] rules and regulations” aimed
to increase the flow and quality of information to investors by “ensuring adherence to legal and
regulatory requirements”).
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS (June 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download
[https://perma.cc/RV43-D9TQ] (indicating that the DOJ examines the effectiveness of a
corporation’s compliance program to determine the appropriate form of prosecution or penalty).
127. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 939 (2017)
(describing the “common structural framework for compliance”).
128. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2077 (2016) (“[C]ompliance has blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance
department has emerged, in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.”).
129. See
generally
Regulatory
Compliance,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/risk-regulatory/compliance-regulatory-riskmanagement.html (last visited July 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TN5Y-UKVZ] (describing
challenges regarding compliance in heavily-regulated areas).
130. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
131. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369, 373 (Del. 2006)
(affirming Caremark and adding a requirement to exercise good faith in dealing with violations,
and writing that where no red flags emerge, a board exhibits good faith by ensuring the existence
of a “reasonable information and reporting system”).
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from violating laws and sanctioning those that do, compliance seeks to
limit corporate risk-taking.
In contrast, sustainability summons a very different set of
forces. Broadly, the ESG process unfolds in three distinct stages. In the
first stage, known as “materiality assessment,” sustainability officers
invite internal and external stakeholders to provide input.132 They
typically begin with employees, who are interviewed outside the
corporate hierarchy in order to identify concerns that may not reach the
executive level. Sustainability leaders then open up the consultation
process to external stakeholders, such as NGOs and academics, as well
as governmental bodies like local authorities and regulators. 133 The
composition of external stakeholders varies by company.134 Inviting
these stakeholders to sit across the table from company officers is a bold
move.135 Most would see themselves as the nemesis of large
corporations and would mobilize to fight against business interests.
Precisely for this reason, as we argue below, their feedback helps
sustainability officers identify concerns whose weight company
management might fail to grasp. Sustainability leaders present the
most important issues, known in industry parlance as material, in a
“materiality matrix” that headlines their report.136
Turning these words into deeds is the key task for the second
stage of the sustainability process,137 where sustainability leaders
propose initiatives to address stakeholders’ concerns. Hopefully, these
will include measurable impact, assessed through key performance
indicators (“KPIs”). For example, a technology company responded to a
concern about excessive screen time for children by instituting a
training program for seventy thousand teachers, seven hundred
thousand children and adolescents, and two hundred thousand

132. KPMG, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) MATERIALITY ASSESSMENT 3
(2017),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/nz/pdf/September/esg-materiality-assessment2017-kpmg-nz.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5E7-DDPX]. For specific examples of various stakeholders
providing input, see infra Section III.B.
133. Telephone Interview with Silvia Garrigo, Vice President, Corp. Responsibility & Soc. Inv.,
Millicom (Mar. 11, 2018).
134. SASB has compiled a map that details financially material sustainability issues by
industry. SASB Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
https://materiality.sasb.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6D8S-5AGD] (defining
material issues by industry based on input from stakeholders).
135. See infra Section III.B for a discussion of how companies and NGOs often collaborate to
address environmental and social risks.
136. Id. For an example of a company’s materiality matrix, see THE CLOROX CO., WHAT’S IN A
BRAND?
2018
INTEGRATED
ANNUAL
REPORT
55
(2018),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/
507168367/files/doc_financials/annuals/2018/Clorox_2018_Integrated_Report_Full-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUD4-TGYR].
137. Telephone Interview with Silvia Garrigo, supra note 133.
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families.138 Other KPIs may institute a timeline for a company to
complete a transition, for example reducing its carbon emissions by 20%
in two years.139 After setting targets, the main task left for the third
stage of the sustainability process is to monitor their performance.
Often, annual sustainability reports offer a structure for this
monitoring by providing momentum for gathering information and
accountability for performing according to plan.
This brief overview of sustainability as a process illustrates its
orientation toward risk mitigation, since its starting point consists in
identifying areas of concern for the company. For that reason,
comparing sustainability with compliance helps animate their
respective strengths and weaknesses. Before we launch into this
comparison, we would like to underline that our claim is not that these
two functions are at war. In fact, the opposite is often true. In some
cases, companies turned to sustainability initiatives at the urging of inhouse lawyers.140 Often, the legal, compliance, and ESG departments
work together to advance future policies. In other cases, both
departments report to the same officer or board committee. This
institutional affinity between sustainability and compliance
underscores why comparing them makes sense.
B. ESG Adopts a Broader View of Harm than Compliance
Even When Protecting the Same Values
Compliance and sustainability are often animated by the same
core values. Take the example of environmental protection. Our
lawmakers have been enacting measures fighting pollution for decades,
setting goals ingrained in companies’ compliance systems.141 It is
almost tautologous to state that similar concerns about the planet’s
well-being also led companies to voluntarily undertake environmentally

138. MILKA PIETIKAINEN & AMAYA GOROSTIAGA, MILLICOM INT’L CELLULAR SA & UNICEF,
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF MOBILE NETWORK OPERATORS ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE MILLICOM
EXPERIENCE 16 (2017), https://www.unicef.org/csr/css/MILLICOM_REPORT_26.07.17.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C6N5-SYFV].
139. See Leslie Hook, Emissions Statement: How Companies Are Getting Serious About
Climate Change, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9b09c96c-f978-11e8-af462022a0b02a6c [https://perma.cc/B5X2-B6SM] (discussing the emissions targets set by various
companies such as “[t]o reduce emissions 15 per cent by 2030”).
140. See UNITED NATIONS GLOB. COMPACT & LINKLATERS LLP, GUIDE FOR GENERAL COUNSEL
ON
CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY
3
(2015),
https://d306pr3pise04h.cloudfront.net/
docs/publications%2FGuide_for_General_Counsel.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FPA-DHVW] (explaining
the trend of lawyers accelerating issues of corporate sustainability within their companies).
141. See Anthony Heyes, Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and
Compliance, 17 J. REG. ECON. 107, 107–08 (2000) (describing past reports on company compliance
with pollution regulations).
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friendly initiatives. The same substantive dynamic between compliance
and sustainability is evident in other areas. In many jurisdictions, laws
protect individuals’ rights to data privacy,142 while sustainability
initiatives are often geared towards cybersecurity, looking to protect
companies’ proprietary information more generally.143 Turning to
gender in the workplace, compliance focuses on sexual harassment and
discrimination,144 while sustainability looks at issues such as women’s
representation in leadership roles.145 In all these cases, the deeper
motives are shared.
But when considering how to best defend and promote these
shared values, compliance’s focus is much narrower. Delaware’s
jurisprudence confines compliance to targeting legal risk, rather than
business risk.146 Consequently, compliance officers look to the law in
order to fulfill obligations and identify elements of violations, without
much leeway for company-by-company variation. This legalistic
approach is even more pronounced in specialized compliance regimes,
such as anti-money laundering, which not only define substantive rules,
but also put in place specific compliance procedures in furtherance of
these rules.147 Bound to legal definitions of misconduct, compliance is,
by necessity, backwards-looking, reflecting conceptions of harm as they
stood at the time of enactment. Often, new practices develop to take
advantage of regulatory loopholes or simply to stay clear of legal
boundaries. Although these practices do not violate any laws, they
sometimes come to present a challenge to the underlying value that our
legal system is trying to serve. Sometimes, the true extent of corporate
misconduct may not become publicly known until much later, when the
impetus for reform is gone. What rules prohibit depends also on the
vicissitudes of our legislative and rulemaking systems.
142. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law,
106 GEO. L.J. 115 (2017) (comparing U.S. and E.U. privacy regimes and social norms).
143. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort & Danuvasin Charoen, Sustainable
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1995, 2006–19 (2016) (applying sustainability frameworks, including business ethics
and CSR, to cybersecurity).
144. See Dworkin & Schipani, supra note 59, at 123 (discussing redress for sexual harassment
and sex discrimination under Title VII).
145. See Emma Hinchcliffe, The Firm Behind ‘Fearless Girl’ Has a Dubious Record of Backing
Gender Diversity as a Shareholder, FORTUNE (Apr. 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://fortune.com/
2019/04/01/state-street-fearless-girl-shareholder-resolutions/
[https://perma.cc/3NLT-FZJG]
(describing campaigns to increase women’s representation on company boards).
146. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123, 130 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(describing a typical failure to monitor claim as involving employee violations of law and holding
that the court will not “disregard the presumptions of the business judgment rule and conclude
that the directors are liable because they did not properly evaluate business risk”).
147. See Stavros Gadinis, International Compliance Regimes, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT
IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP?, supra note 47, at 319, 327–30.
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In contrast, sustainability’s mission is not hardwired in
statutory mandates or regulations, but instead rooted in voluntary
commitments that companies can constantly redefine. This flexibility is
particularly valuable because, unlike the policymakers that set
compliance’s goals, companies have access to far superior information
sources that can detect harm and more imaginative solutions for
anticipating or remedying it. Unlike policymakers, who obtain
information through external sources and in the aggregate, companies
can access information from internal and external stakeholders in a
way that is tailored to its specific operations. In the context of the
materiality assessment described above, sustainability leaders seek to
identify issues that are not on the company’s radar by turning to
external stakeholders, such as customers, civil society groups, NGOs,
the media, and academia. Often, external stakeholders include local
authorities and other government bodies. Far from being allies of the
corporate world, these groups are its traditional adversaries. Their
opposition is rooted in their perception of “big business” as a destructive
force that often disregards its impact on society.148 But, because this
information often does not implicate legal violations, compliance
systems are not designed to register it, much less actively pursue it.
Thus, it often goes undetected, unless—or until—it grows into
genuine misconduct.
While external stakeholders rarely appear on compliance’s
radar, ESG sees these groups not only as watchdogs, but also as
partners of companies, inviting them to sit across the table and share
their concerns. This exchange of information often leads to results. For
instance, hundreds of NGOs have cropped up in the past two years
alone to amplify the impact of plastic pollution on the planet.149 In
response, some companies are collaborating and dedicating millions of
dollars in research and development for plastic alternatives, 150 while
others are investing in infrastructure that prevents plastic from
148. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Is Big Government or Big Business the Bigger Threat?,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
14,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/is-biggovernment-or-big-business-the-bigger-threat/249973/ [https://perma.cc/8AMP-PTZ7] (presenting
the threat posed by big business to American liberalism as an established pillar of public opinion;
Gallup has been consistently tracking Americans’ perceptions of its force since 1965, comparing it
with two other such threats, namely big government and big labor).
149. These NGOs have joined forces in a collective effort called “The Plastic Pollution
Coalition.” The Coalition, PLASTIC POLLUTION COAL., https://www.plasticpollutioncoalition.org/
the-coalition (last visited July 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7NZX-VSHQ].
150. See Mark Wilson, The World’s Largest Packaged Food Company Will Ditch Single-use
Plastic, FAST CO. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90294975/the-planets-largestpackaged-food-company-is-ditching-plastic [https://perma.cc/UG3F-CBR6] (explaining that large
companies such as Starbucks and McDonald’s have contributed millions of dollars to find a more
sustainable cup standard and that the design will not be proprietary).
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reaching oceans.151 In another example, palm oil producers have joined
forces with the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace, and other civil society
organizations to develop standards that stem deforestation and human
rights abuses.152 Similarly, Belgian chocolate producers teamed up with
civil society organizations and government representatives for an
initiative to eliminate child labor, fight deforestation, and provide
decent pay and education to the families of cocoa workers.153 Other
examples include the fashion industry154 and mining.155 Rather than
“keeping their friends close and their enemies closer,” companies are
devoting resources to addressing concerns expressed by these groups.
Consumers are another key stakeholder. In addition to routine
surveys, sustainability officers also utilize informal mechanisms to
capture tidbits of data that could affect the company’s profile and
reputation or societal trends that may emerge into risks. At one
company we visited, a group of interns worked in an open office with
large screens monitoring what the youth in various markets were
saying about the company on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media
platforms. For the less well-heeled, a seemingly endless number of new
technology products are being launched to help companies monitor their
reputation on social media. Input from the same stakeholders has a
different weight across companies. For a consumer company such as
Apple, the views of individual customers matter more than they would
for, say, a steel company.

151. See Dow Announces New Actions to Support Global Efforts on Plastic Waste, DOW (Nov.
27, 2018), https://corporate.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/dow-announces-new-actions-tosupport-global-efforts-on-plastic-waste [https://perma.cc/T5LG-B4YY]; see also Charlotte
Middlehurst, Waste-to-Energy: Panacea for Asia’s Pollution Problem or a Load of Rubbish?, FIN.
TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/75312290-7d61-11e9-8b5c-33d0560f039c
[https://perma.cc/8K2J-P9TY] (describing the Chinese government’s pursuit of a
waste-to-energy policy).
152. Palm Oil Producers, NGOs Launch Responsible Palm Oil Initiative at RSPO AGM,
FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.forestpeoples.org/en/topics/palm-oilrspo/news/2013/11/palm-oil-producers-ngos-launch-responsible-palm-oil-initiative-rsp
[https://perma.cc/Y4MX-KWBA].
153. Belgian Chocolate 100% Sustainable by 2025, BRUSSELS TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/belgium-all-news/health/52352/belgian-chocolate-100sustainable-by-2025/ [https://perma.cc/J2HC-NDY8].
154. See, e.g., Amanda Cotler, Why Sustainable Fashion Matters, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellevate/2019/10/07/why-sustainable-fashion-matters/
[https://perma.cc/4J9D-LANZ] (describing how consumers are pushing fashion companies to
develop sustainable fabrics that are better for the environment).
155. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., PRACTICAL ACTIONS FOR COMPANIES TO
IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR IN MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS 21–30
(2017), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Practical-actions-for-worst-forms-of-child-labour-miningsector.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z7N-2XJJ] (report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development recommending a due diligence framework to mining companies in order to assess
risks for child labor).
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A key internal source of information for the ESG function
includes employees, a group that compliance also shares. ESG leaders,
however, are not interested in how employees perform their mandated
obligations, but in problems that the rulebook fails to capture.
Employees are often the first ones to observe a major threat to the
company’s core business because they are in direct contact with any
harm potentially caused.156 It is because of their informational
advantage that employees form the most common category of
whistleblowers.157 Sustainability provides them with a platform to
express concerns early and without fear of adverse career implications,
as it is largely informal.158 ESG officers interview company employees
across the corporate hierarchy. This process allows the sustainability
team to identify inconsistencies between commitments made at
headquarters and what is happening on the ground, as well as new risks
that managers may not have fully comprehended.159
The difference between the compliance and ESG approaches can
help explain why companies hit by compliance failures turn to ESG in
an effort to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Wynn Hotels, whose
CEO and founder resigned amidst a widely publicized sexual
harassment scandal,160 recruited new female directors161 and
introduced new communication channels between these directors and
employees.162 Collectively branded the “Women’s Leadership Forum,”
these communication channels include town hall meetings, events, and
fireside chats between directors and employees outside the typical
corporate reporting hierarchy or the compliance apparatus.163 But this

156. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2224–26 (2010) (indicating that employees often serve a role in
fraud detection).
157. See id. at 2214, 2240 (explaining that employees are the most common whistleblowers
and that they “clearly have the best access to information”).
158. We explain below that, in contrast with compliance, sustainability processes do not
necessarily end with liability, so fear of retribution is lower. See infra Section III.A.
159. For an example of how employee observations help sustainability officers, see infra
Section III.B.
160 Alexandra Berzon, Chris Kirkham, Elizabeth Bernstein & Kate O’Keeffe, Dozens of
People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-people-recount-pattern-of-sexual-misconductby-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953 [https://perma.cc/M5Q2-WHAG].
161 Aaron Smith, Wynn Resorts Appoints 3 Women to Board in a ‘Turning Point,’ CNN BUS.
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/18/news/companies/wynn-women-board-ofdirectors/index.html [https://perma.cc/W7HZ-5U2Z].
162. See Press Release, Wynn Las Vegas, Wynn Resorts Launches Women’s Leadership Forum
Series with Inaugural Event at Wynn Las Vegas (May 17, 2018), https://press.wynnlasvegas.com/
press-releases/wynn-resorts-launches-women-s-leadership-forum-series-with-inaugural—eventat-wynn-las-vegas/s/97d36392-e135-4bd3-be5b-bb373b772c12 [https://perma.cc/5GPJ-K2P9].
163. Id.
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approach is hardly unique to companies emerging from scandal.
LinkedIn’s CEO, Jeff Weiner, refers to his own style of leadership as
“compassionate management,” encouraging employees to speak up and
address pain points in town hall meetings.164 Other companies, such as
Salesforce and Amazon, conduct regular surveys among their
employees seeking input about employee or sustainability issues.165
C. ESG Addresses Social or Moral Challenges Even
When No Laws Are Violated
The informational advantage enjoyed by company ESG officers
over policymakers is even starker when business developments
generate new social challenges that fall outside the current ambit of the
law. We live in an era of huge business disruption, where successful
startups can become multibillion-dollar companies in the span of a few
years.166 The explosion of social media has driven millions of users to
voluntarily relinquish their private information online and only slowly
come to grips with the myriad ways in which this can be exploited. 167
The sharing economy is revolutionizing workforce arrangements,168
redesigning our urban domains,169 and dislocating long-term
164. Bill Snyder, Jeff Weiner: Manage Compassionately, and Prepare for the Next Worker
Revolution, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS.: INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/jeff-weiner-manage-compassionately-prepare-next-workerrevolution [https://perma.cc/9KLB-VSMW].
165. Adam Robinson, How Airbnb and Salesforce Are Leading the Way When It Comes to
Employee Engagement, INC.COM (May 1, 2019), https://www.inc.com/adam-robinson/how-airbnbsalesforce-are-leading-way-when-it-comes-to-employee-engagement.html [https://perma.cc/P93YC33B]; Valentina Zarya, Amazon Wants to Know How Employees Are Feeling—Every Single Day,
FORTUNE (Oct. 9. 2015, 3:04 PM), https://fortune.com/2015/10/09/amazon-employees-feeling/
[https://perma.cc/3FC9-8SRG].
166. See Zoë Bernard, 10 Startups That Became Worth Billions in Less than 3 Years, BUS.
INSIDER (May 1, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fastest-startups-to-becameunicorns-by-crossing-1-billion-valuation-list-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/9A22-WV3X] (describing socalled “unicorns”: private companies valued at over a billion dollars or more).
167. See Alex Hern, Why Have We Given Up Our Privacy to Facebook and Other Sites So
Willingly?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/whyhave-we-given-up-our-privacy-to-facebook-and-other-sites-so-willingly [https://perma.cc/6UXUQQVT] (“We’re all losing control of our data, both online and off, and we’re starting to kick back. . . .
[T]he burgeoning #deletefacebook movement [is] picking up steam.”).
168. See M. Keith Chen, Judith A. Chevalier, Peter E. Rossi & Emily Oehlsen, The Value of
Flexible Work: Evidence from Uber Drivers, 127 J. POL. ECON. 2735, 2736, 2792 (2019) (arguing
that flexibility generates value for Uber drivers).
169. See Luke Carroll, Airbnb, Other Home-Sharing Remove 31,000 Homes from Nation’s
Rental
Market,
Study
Says,
CHRON. HERALD
(June 28,
2019,
7:30
AM),
https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/canada/airbnb-other-home-sharing-remove-31000homes-from-nations-rental-market-study-says-327728/
[https://perma.cc/JY39-UA9W]
(explaining that Airbnb and other home-sharing services “were responsible for keeping 31,000
homes off Canada’s long-term rental market”); Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact
on S.F., S.F. CHRON. (June 2014), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/Window-into-Airbnb-
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residents.170 Artificial intelligence expands the use of computing power
into new areas, substituting human judgment with pre-calibrated
algorithms.171 These are only a few examples of imminent challenges
facing companies.
Despite these mounting challenges, the policymaking response
has so far been underwhelming, when not entirely lacking. To be fair,
policymaking is a time-consuming process, which requires generating
public support, building political alliances, lobbying, and counterlobbying. It takes time until the real impact of the problem is fully
revealed and touches a broad enough base of voters to spur lawmakers
into action.172 This lengthy process is further compounded by political
deadlock and polarization.173 Some companies, like Uber174 and
Airbnb,175 have had their run-ins with local authorities, facing bans or
permitting requirements. Still, these were mostly localized responses
s-hidden-impact-on-S-F-30110.php [https://perma.cc/LUM7-9CUB] (indicating that almost five
thousand San Francisco homes, apartments, and private or shared rooms are offered for rent
on Airbnb).
170. See Steven Poole, Airbnb Can’t Go On Unregulated – It Does Too Much Damage to Cities,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2018/oct/24/airbnb-unregulated-damage-cities-barcelona-law-locals [https://perma.cc/E98P-VG76]
(arguing that Airbnb prices out and displaces local residents).
171. See generally Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Technologies and the Tech
Nirvana Fallacy 7, 12–13 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 457, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392321
[https://perma.cc/DSL9-5K4D]
(arguing contrary to the “tech nirvana fallacy,” which predicts that technology will replace human
judgment and boards).
172. See Drew DeSilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws than
Before, but Not More Substance, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress/
[https://perma.cc/2RTG-AHN3] (explaining recent bipartisan legislation, including an overhaul of
the criminal justice system, legislation addressing the opioid crisis, and the “first comprehensive
NASA authorization bill in more than six years”).
173. See id. (describing the inability of Congress and President Trump to agree on temporary
funding measures in the 115th Congress).
174. See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap as New York City Takes Lead in
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-votecity-council-cap.html [https://perma.cc/XBY2-FAAL] (discussing New York City’s decision to halt
new vehicle licenses for ride-hail services like Uber); Dirk VanderHart, Proposal to Regulate Uber,
Lyft Spurts Debate in Oregon Capitol, OR. PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 18, 2019, 2:31 PM),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/uber-lyft-oregon-capitol-debate/ [https://perma.cc/7XF2-3ZXS]
(explaining that Oregon lawmakers are considering a bill to allow localities to enforce additional
regulations on Uber operations).
175. See,
e.g.,
New
York
Deflates
Airbnb,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
27,
2016),
https://www.economist.com/business/2016/10/27/new-york-deflates-airbnb
[https://perma.cc/
USE7-HVNT] (discussing recent legislation in New York fining individuals for renting properties
of whole units in residential blocks for less than 30 days); Joe Williams, Airbnb Crackdowns in
DC, New York Foreshadow Fierce Struggles in 2019, WASH. EXAM’R (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/business/airbnb-crackdowns-in-dc-new-york-foreshadowfierce-struggles-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/F43G-HZXC] (describing how Washington, D.C. and
New York City have implemented measures to limit the types of property that can be rented
through Airbnb).
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rather than overarching frameworks. Thus, lawmakers and regulators
seem to have had neither the time nor the inclination to understand the
challenges posed, let alone respond to them effectively.
But the disruptors themselves—that is, the companies building
new businesses on the ground, their suppliers, their creditors, and their
investors—are the first ones to come across disconcerting
repercussions. Due to their links to affected stakeholders and local
communities, sustainability teams are well placed to grasp the impact
of company choices on a broader set of constituents and even gauge
public reaction. ESG’s informational advantage will be particularly
valuable when a crisis hits the company. Faced by narratives of
unsuspected victims suffering harm they did not bargain for, the
company can hardly protect itself by pointing out that it did not actually
violate any laws.176 Thus, the absence of legal obligations, which might
have been welcome when business was developing, will turn into a
drawback when the true extent of the harm is revealed. To avoid this
outcome, the company needs a clear-eyed perspective on the interests
of affected constituents, and decisive action to protect the ones most
valuable for the company in the long run. The ESG function is wellequipped to serve this role.
The most recent Facebook/Cambridge Analytica debacle
exemplifies a profound corporate crisis, unabated by the absence of any
primary legal violations, that a robust sustainability function could
have helped to avoid. Even though Facebook could claim to have
obtained the contractual consent of its users for exploiting their data, it
faced accusations that its practices violated users’ privacy.177 Mark
Zuckerberg found himself the unwilling protagonist of a ritualistic
congressional hearing,178 culminating in a humbling apology to stem the
slide of the company’s share price.179 He repeated time and again that
176. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 41 (discussing Facebook’s response to the leak of private
user data to Cambridge Analytica, a voter-profiling company, and suggesting possible violations
of election laws by Cambridge Analytica).
177. See id.
178. See Kevin Roose & Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Testifies on Facebook Before Skeptical
Lawmakers,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/10/us/politics/zuckerberg-facebook-senate-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/4WTJ-NGCB]
(describing Zuckerberg’s congressional appearance as a “pointed gripe session”).
179. See Sheena McKenzie, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says Sorry in Full-Page Newspaper
Ads, CNN (Mar. 25, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/25/europe/facebook-zuckerbergcambridge-analytica-sorry-ads-newspapers-intl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8YW2-8U6L]
(explaining that Facebook took out full-page advertisements in British and American newspapers
to apologize for its role in the Cambridge Analytica scandal after the company’s value plunged
almost $50 billion); Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Mark Zuckerberg Has Regrets: ‘I’m Really Sorry that
This Happened,’ CNN BUS. (Mar. 21, 2018, 10:17 PM), https://money.cnn.com/
2018/03/21/technology/mark-zuckerberg-apology/index.html [https://perma.cc/SSP7-LYLT]; see
also Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Starts Paying a Price for Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018),
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no laws were violated,180 but shareholders could not have been happy
with how the crisis unfolded within the company.181 In the end,
Zuckerberg stated that regulation was “inevitable,” recognizing the
need for a stricter framework.182
Yet, details of the problem were well-known among employees,
who were concerned about the company’s treatment of its users. Alex
Stamos, the company’s chief security officer, had spotted potential gaps
months before the scandal broke and rang the alarm bells.183 But Cheryl
Sandberg, Facebook’s chief operating officer, chose not to heed
warnings, misjudging how users would react if the problem was
revealed.184 As Facebook’s former vice president for global
communications, marketing, and public policy recently conceded, “We
failed to look and try to imagine what was hiding behind corners.”185

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/technology/facebook-revenue-scandals.html
[https://perma.cc/B82X-52JU] (detailing Facebook’s business losses following the Cambridge
Analytica scandal).
180. Mark Zuckerberg stated that he did not believe Facebook had violated its consent decree
with the FTC, nor any other obligation under then-current law, but that it ought to have in place
stricter protections than law demands. Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH.
POST (April 10, 2018, 9:25 PM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/
[https://perma.cc/6WZH-SQSB]
(“But as I've said a number of times today, I think we need to take a broader view of our
responsibility around privacy than just what is mandated in the current law.”)
181. Indeed, a derivative suit followed soon after. See Hamza Shaban, Shareholder Sues
Facebook
After
Stock
Plunges,
WASH.
POST
(July
30,
2018,
10:30
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/30/shareholder-sues-facebook-after-stockplunges/ [https://perma.cc/4MSK-5PL9] (discussing an investor lawsuit accusing the company of
misleading shareholders over the data privacy scandal involving Cambridge Analytica); Julia
Carrie Wong, Angry Facebook Shareholders Challenge Zuckerberg over ‘Corporate Dictatorship,’
GUARDIAN
(May
31,
2018,
18:27
PM
EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/may/31/facebook-shareholder-meeting-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/XD2ZFLFB] (describing anger towards Zuckerberg at Facebook’s shareholder meeting).
182. Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. 33 (2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Cofounder, Chairman
and CEO, Facebook, Inc.).
183. Nicole Perlroth, Sheera Frenkel & Scott Shane, Facebook Exit Hints at Dissent on
Handling of Russian Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/facebook-alex-stamos.html [https://perma.cc/XW4V-XWPH] (“Mr. Stamos . . . had
advocated more disclosure around Russian interference of the platform and some restructuring to
better address the issues, but was met with resistance by colleagues.”); Matthew Rosenberg,
Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data
of
Millions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/
us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/D9T8-CUZT] (explaining
how data collected by Cambridge Analytica played an essential role in Russian interference with
the 2016 U.S. presidential election).
184. See id.
185. Sheera Frenkel, Nicholas Confessore, Cecilia Kang, Matthew Rosenberg & Jack Nicas,
Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html
[https://perma.cc/V5YD-5BN7].
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Facebook’s blind spot is hardly surprising given that it is a clear
laggard in sustainability, at least from the outside. Facebook does not
release a sustainability report, now published by about 78% of S&P 500
companies.186 These reports often follow rigorous templates such as the
Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), whose Standard 418187 sets out
reporting requirements for customer privacy. While sustainability
reports are informative for investors and consumers, their value also
lies in the exercise of self-reflection and self-discipline they require
companies to undertake. As Tim Mohin, the GRI president, recently
noted, “[R]eporting can be more of a mirror than a window . . . .”188
Facebook just had not looked in that mirror yet. After the scandal,
Zuckerberg acknowledged that Facebook needs “to take a broader view
of our responsibility around privacy than just what is mandated in the
current law.”189
In contrast with Facebook’s casual apathy on privacy, ESG
proposes voluntary self-regulation, developed through ongoing
engagement with stakeholders, including regulators and other
government authorities. Leading Silicon Valley in-house lawyers
advocate for this strategy as a risk mitigation tool, arguing that it will
prove beneficial when government knocks on their door.190 For example,
when Lyft and Uber were founded, there was no regulation of
ridesharing and there were no mandatory laws regarding liability
insurance for their drivers.191 Lyft’s response to this regulatory vacuum
was to create its own safety protocols, including instituting background
checks for drivers, mandating periodic vehicle inspections, and
requiring drivers to carry $1 million in liability insurance.192 To
186. Kwon, supra note 5, at 3.
187. GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI 418: CUSTOMER PRIVACY 2016, at 2 (2018),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/gri-418-customerprivacy-2016/ [https://perma.cc/5A3Y-SFER] (click “download standard” and fill out form to
view report).
188. Bob Eccles, Twenty Years of the Global Reporting Initiative: Interview with CEO Tim
Mohin, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2017, 9:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobeccles/
2017/08/15/twenty-years-of-the-global-reporting-initiative-interview-with-ceo-tim-mohin/
[https://perma.cc/8HJB-D3CV].
189. Elizabeth Weise, Will the FTC Come Down Hard on Facebook? It's Only Happened Twice
in 20 Years, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/04/17/ftc-come-down-hardfacebook-its-only-happened-twice-20-years/508067002/ (last updated Apr. 19, 2018, 3:22 PM ET)
[https://perma.cc/3B6C-SNEM].
190. Irene Liu, Knocking on Government Doors: How Do You Respond to the Government
Knocking on Your Door?, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL EXEC . INST. (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.legalexecutiveinstitute.com/knocking-on-government-doors-government-knocking/
[https://perma.cc/Y4GF-TTFP].
191. Interview with Kristin Sverchek, Gen. Counsel, Lyft (Aug. 28, 2019).
192. See id.; Rose Ors, Conversation with Kristin Svercheck, CLIENTSMART: VOICES IN
SUSTAINABILITY (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.clientsmart.net/blog/voices-in-sustainability-
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implement this framework, Lyft hired an in-house insurance broker
and developed a tailored product.193 Throughout this process, Lyft’s
general counsel kept in close contact with regulators at California’s
Public Utilities Commission.194 When California became the first state
to regulate rideshare companies in 2013, the enacted provisions echoed
Lyft’s regime.195 Poles apart from Lyft’s considerate approach was
Uber’s Travis Kalanick, who saw the regulatory vacuum into which
rideshare companies were founded as an opportunity.196 Uber went so
far as to develop software to thwart the sting operations of undercover
police officers fining drivers and impounding cars. 197 This literal game
of “cat and mouse” that Uber aggressively played exploited grey areas
in the law.198
III. ESG AS A SUPERIOR STRATEGY FOR ELICITING INFORMATION
We have shown that ESG turns to stakeholders in order to elicit
information, but ESG is far from being the only avenue through which
these stakeholders interact with the company. Employees, for example,
interact with the company’s hierarchy daily and are also subject to its
compliance oversight. Other stakeholders, like local authorities, may
cross the company’s path less regularly, but nevertheless quite
frequently. Still others, like NGOs or regulatory agencies, often find
themselves opposing company actions. Thus, to understand ESG’s
strength as an information collection tool, we need to explore why these
disparate actors are willing to abandon deep-rooted fears and long-held
biases and share information with ESG freely, or at least more willingly
as compared to other forums.
Below, we argue that information flows openly from
stakeholders to management through ESG for two reasons. First, ESG’s

conversation-with-kristin-sverchek [https://perma.cc/4LJ4-CMR3] (an interview with Lyft’s
General Counsel during which she explains that on her first day on the job, she went to the
California Public Utilities Commission “to assure them we are aligned with what they care about.
Being open to sitting down and talking with regulators is how we conduct business”).
193. Interview with Kristin Sverchek, supra note 191.
194. Ors, supra note 192.
195. Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New
Entrants to Transportation Industry, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N 23 (Sept. 19, 2013),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/77112285.PDF
[https://perma.cc/K2Y7-VEPM] (“Additionally, Lyft has been the only TNC that has acknowledged
that safety is not only a priority, but there should also be some overarching rules and regulations.
We applaud Lyft for its leadership in this area and we certainly agree with Lyft in this area.”).
196. See MIKE ISAAC, SUPERPUMPED: THE BATTLE FOR UBER 245 (2019) (“The term ‘gray area’
was music to Travis Kalanick’s ears.”).
197. Id.
198. See id. (describing Uber’s efforts to evade regulatory oversight).
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forward-looking perspective and inclusivity help stakeholders overcome
the threats of liability and retaliation that often undermine compliance.
Where compliance seeks to sanction and deter, ESG seeks to reconcile
and inspire. Second, ESG helps establish trust between the company
and its stakeholders. Throughout the ESG process, information flows in
both directions. By showing interest and undertaking initiatives, the
company also communicates to stakeholders its commitment to shared
values, to be proven in practice through its initiatives. Thus,
stakeholders are more likely to trust a company with a more successful
ESG function.
A. Sustainability Helps Overcome the Threat of Liability and
Retaliation that Undermines Compliance
For any company employee caught misbehaving, and for any
manager found to have turned a blind eye or simply let her guard down,
an internal compliance investigation is a stressful process. Often, the
risk of legal liability looms large, forcing the main culprits behind a wall
of self-protection.199 Regardless of legal sanctions, targets may lose their
job or suffer a career setback.200 Even without being directly targeted,
those participating in the process may come to perceive it as strict and
bureaucratic.201 Compliance produces a written record often
synthesized in a report, which can be unearthed in inopportune
moments.202 Under such circumstances, blowing the whistle on
coworkers may not be the easiest choice, countermanded by feelings of
loyalty and sympathy.203 It is not surprising that employee cooperation
with compliance staff has never been entirely smooth.
Even from the board itself, compliance often elicits a mix of
eagerness and trepidation. Corporate boards have authorized and
overseen a huge expansion of compliance departments in an effort to
199. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL S TUD. 833, 859–60 (1994) (indicating that corporations may conceal evidence of their agents’
crimes to minimize expected liability).
200. Cf. id. at 860 (suggesting that corporations may shift criminal liability on to the
responsible agents).
201. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 125, at 2154–55 (describing in-house compliance
officers as part of the “professional class” who share characteristics of outside gatekeepers such as
accountants, bankers, and attorneys); see also Langevoort, supra note 127, at 941 (discussing the
“check-the-box mentality” surrounding compliance).
202. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 125, at 2170 (indicating that plaintiffs often seek
compliance reports in derivative suits).
203. See id. at 2149 (explaining that compliance staff may suppress corporate failures due to
peer pressure); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence
of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 590 (2008) (discussing the legal concept of
good faith in Delaware and its effect on director accountability).
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rein in corporate misconduct and satisfy their fiduciary duties. 204 But,
as we have discussed elsewhere, compliance reports that raise red flags
informing the board about violations are an essential link in
establishing bad faith if the board then subsequently fails to address
these violations adequately.205 Practically, the board may wish to never
have known about illegal activity, because then it risks seeing its
reactions challenged in court.206 Under such threat, boards may choose
to stay aloof and limit their exposure to challenging reports, rather than
step up and fix the problem.207 Ultimately, compliance is a mechanism
intended to deter violations through monitoring and to impose
sanctions in a quasi-disciplinary setting when violations are caught.
Deterrence and sanctioning have an important role to play in fighting
corporate wrongdoing. But clearly, they are intended to be feared and
not celebrated.208
This conundrum of risk monitoring and liability eases
considerably under the umbrella of sustainability. Although
sustainability evolves around issues of key legal interest, it employs a
non-confrontational approach. Sustainability does not point the finger
toward specific problematic individuals, but instead deals in broader
terms, emphasizing culture, values, and relationships. 209 It does not get
triggered by a mandate to penalize a violation, but by a desire to uphold
a value.210 It does not scrutinize the past, seeking to sanction mistakes,

204. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 125, at 2139, 2146, 2152 (describing the explosion of
corporate compliance departments in the last ten years as a result of changes in Delaware law and
corporate misconduct scandals).
205. See id. at 2190–94 (explaining that compliance reports establishing the board’s bad faith
are often key to cementing liability in legal cases against boards and management).
206. See Arlen, supra note 199, at 859 (indicating that internal corporate reports of misconduct
may lead to additional liability for corporations).
207. See id. (explaining the possible liability that can result from internal corporate reports);
see also Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 125, at 2175–79 (describing board responses to “red flags”
from internal reports).
208. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 205 (2019) (explaining that
organizations have initiated compliance programs “out of fear of sanction, harm, retribution,
or ridicule”).
209. See Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and Sustainability: An Argument for Responsible
Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 363, 385–87, 399 (2007)
(“[S]takeholder theory has evolved . . . into a more developed inquiry into the nature of stakeholder
relationships . . . . The relationships between workers, firms, and the environment are both
distinct and interrelational . . . . Sustainability . . . [builds] upon existing relationships,
interconnectedness, and synergies.”).
210. See, e.g., THE COCA-COLA CO., 2018 BUSINESS & SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 25–32 (2018),
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/fileassets/pdf/2019/CocaCola-Business-and-Sustainability-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/49A9-Y6ZM] (indicating that CocaCola’s values encouraged the company to take part in initiatives aimed at reducing packaging
waste, replenishing water and preventing droughts, and sourcing sustainably).
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but looks to the future, helping the company evolve.211 The outcome of
a sustainability initiative is not severance or lawsuit, but a transformed
product, process, or corporate culture.212 In our meetings and
roundtables, participants repeatedly emphasized that employees
participating in sustainability discussions are more forthcoming about
issues that threaten the company.213
For the individuals participating in attaining a KPI, the
experience is markedly different than the bureaucratic, quasidisciplinary compliance exercise. Sustainability may replace previous
practices, but it does not directly criticize the employees who followed
and tolerated them, making it easier for all to adopt and adapt. Of
course, not all may be amenable to change, and sometimes changing
established patterns of behavior may prove an uphill battle. But the
mere fact that sustainability focuses on company-wide initiatives
rather than individuals’ own failures removes a point of contention and
helps push reforms forward. Sustainability brings with it a promise for
self-improvement in the form of a recognition that, regardless of how
we did business in the past, we can do better from now on.
To insulate participants from fear of retaliation or other legal
entanglements and invite uninhibited information flow, Airbnb
redesigned its approach. Its general counsel, Rob Chesnut, invested in
developing direct communication with employees that emphasizes
proactive conversations and risk prevention, as opposed to only reactive
investigations and sanctions.214 In an unusual commitment for such a
high-ranking executive, he personally led an orientation session for new
Airbnb employees each week to champion the company’s values and

211. See Radin, supra note 209, at 398 (“[Sustainability] emphasizes investments in the future
rather than one-time actions.”).
212. See Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability and Social Responsibility: A
Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. B.J. 368, 369 (2008) (“[A] distinguishing feature of a corporate social
responsibility program is the notion that long-term environmental and social aspects, as well as
economic aspects, be integrated into a corporation’s business strategy . . . .”).
213. Our interviews provided individual as well as aggregate level examples of these effects.
At the individual level, employees in energy companies were more willing to share concerns with
sustainability officers about potential environmental violations, rather than alerting compliance
officers to these problems. Representatives of companies participating in our November 2018
Roundtable emphasized that employees are more willing to share information with sustainability
officers because their comments can have a broader scope and do not trigger a formal investigation
into their colleagues. At the aggregate level, many companies responded to #MeToo by creating
forums where employees, particularly female ones, can discuss experiences and share information
so that they effect a broader change in culture.
214. Interview with Rob Chesnut, Gen. Counsel, Airbnb (Oct. 11, 2019). Chesnut recently
published a book about how fostering a culture of integrity is vital to corporate success, premised
on his work at Airbnb. See ROBERT CHESNUT, INTENTIONAL INTEGRITY: HOW SMART COMPANIES
CAN LEAD AN ETHICAL REVOLUTION (2020).
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strengthen connections.215 He based his sweeping and nonhierarchical
approach not on the concept of law, which he believed would alienate
people, but on the concept of practical integrity, which resonated with
employees.216 Rob Chesnut now focuses all his time into this work as
the company’s “Chief Ethics Officer.”217
B. Sustainability Addresses Uncertainties Through
Commitment to Values and Trust
Uncertainty is endemic in many arrangements that companies
enter into, from contracts with employees to government permits.
Because predicting and writing clauses about all contingencies is
impossible, a robust ESG function signals a commitment to the values
that will guide the company in addressing existing or future problems.
The stronger this commitment, the greater its importance for employees
and stakeholders. Organized communities have long addressed such
uncertainties by relying on the concept of social capital. People in a
society adhere to unwritten norms voluntarily—even though it is costly
to them and beneficial to a third party—because they expect that, if
they are the ones standing to benefit at a future moment, others will
also adhere to society’s norms.218 Particularly when norm violations
would result in externalities, adherence is meaningful both for the
party itself, which internalizes the cost on the expectation that future
would-be violators will do the same, but also for society, which averts
these externalities. In his seminal work, Robert Putnam describes
social capital as valuable connections among individuals based on
“reciprocity and trustworthiness,”219 while La Porta et al. underline the
“propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially
efficient outcomes.”220 According to a leading study of company

215. Caroline Spiezio, Airbnb’s General Counsel Shows Up and Gets Creative to Promote
Employee Ethics, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS. (Jun. 13, 2019, 6:51 PM), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2019/06/13/airbnbs-general-counsel-shows-up-and-gets-creative-to-promoteemployee-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/2AEG-LX5F].
216. See id. (“Chesnut said that [a system of ethics advisers] allows employees who may be
nervous about going to legal to speak with someone they know about their issue.”).
217. Id.; see also Phillip Bantz, Airbnb Chief Ethics Officer, Ex-General Counsel Rob Chesnut
Steps Down, LAW.COM (May 29, 2020), https://www-law-com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/
corpcounsel/2020/05/29/airbnb-chief-ethics-officer-ex-general-counsel-rob-chesnut-steps-down/
[https://perma.cc/3CJK-TSBS].
218. Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, The Role of Social Capital in Corporations: A Review, 33
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 201, 203 (2017).
219. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2001).
220. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W Vishny, Trust
in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 333 (1997).
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performance during the 2008 financial crisis, companies with robust
corporate social responsibility programs prior to 2008 were better able
to weather the crisis.221 Their successful performance, the study
claims, was due to the trust they were able to inspire in consumers
and regulators.222
1. Sustainability Helps Companies Inspire Employees
To illustrate how sustainability can help reduce uncertainty by
fostering norms and building trust, let us consider an employment
contract that may last for years. There are many aspects of company
life, hierarchy, and culture that are hard to stipulate contractually. For
example, a female employee considering whether to join the company
may be uncertain about the company’s commitment to gender equity.
Clearly, monitoring alone cannot fully resolve this problem, since not
every employee interaction can be monitored. Imagine now that our
company shows its commitment to gender equality through its
sustainability initiatives, such as releasing equal pay data. The
employee can be more confident that the company will not tolerate
practices that disadvantage women. In addition, by adhering to this
norm herself, she can help establish a more inclusive workplace for her
other female colleagues. By becoming personally invested in promoting
company values, employees also grow more loyal to their company and
more committed to its success beyond the confines of their job
description.223 Their job is not simply a means of securing the
necessities of life, but a personal contribution to a greater mission.
But employees can also play an important role in enforcing
norms and ensuring that companies’ commitments to values do not
become empty words, as Google’s recent travails show. Since the early
2000s, its famous “don’t be evil” motto allowed Google to hire thousands
of highly talented employees who felt committed to its mission of

221. Karl V. Lins, Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance:
The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility During the Financial Crisis, 72 J. FIN. 1785, 1819–
20 (2017).
222. Id.
223. See WILLIAM D. EGGERS, NATE WONG & KATE COONEY, DELOITTE UNIV. PRESS, THE
PURPOSE-DRIVEN PROFESSIONAL 4–6 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/
us/articles/harnessing-impact-of-corporate-social-responsibility-on-talent/DUP_1286_Purposedriven-talent_MASTER.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XJP-GJ3A]; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE
KEYS TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/
en/about-us/corporate-responsibility/assets/pwc-employee-engagement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
64RZ-S5RR]; Robert E. Quinn & Anjan V. Thakor, Creating a Purpose-Driven Organization, HARV.
BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/creating-a-purpose-driven-organization
[https://perma.cc/N2HY-Z4WN].
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making information available to all.224 Since its founding, Google has
nurtured a culture of employee feedback through face-to-face town hall
meetings with founders and large-scale surveys, inviting employees’
comments on everything from management and strategy to diversity
and inclusion, and even President Trump’s position on immigration.225
So, when management considered projects viewed as
antithetical to Google’s values, employees were ready to fight back.
They convinced management to drop Project Maven, which would have
developed artificial intelligence technology to help the U.S. military
enhance its drones, estimated to bring almost $70 million to Google in
the first year alone.226 They also convinced Google to withdraw from
Project Dragonfly, its censored search engine in China, thus reaffirming
its commitment to openness.227
Of course, open dialogue can also bring to light differences of
opinion that might not always reach happy resolution. After revelations
that Google had offered multimillion-dollar severance packages to highranking executives accused of sexual harassment, employees around
the world staged dramatic walkouts.228 Their demands included an end
to mandatory arbitration for harassment claims, public data on the
gender pay gap and sexual harassment reports, elevating the role of the
chief diversity officer, and putting an employee representative on the
board.229 Google has acquiesced to some demands, such as providing
224. See
Steve
Lohr,
Don’t
Be
Evil,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
26,
2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/weekinreview/dont-be-evil.html
[https://perma.cc/UN8PRL9C] (discussing Google’s announcement of the motto “don’t be evil”).
225. See, e.g., Steffen Maier, How Google Uses People Analytics to Create a Great Workplace,
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/284550 [https://perma.cc/
CW7V-Y76Y] (providing an example of Google’s efforts to incorporate the feedback of low-level
employees into management’s strategy).
226. Scott Shane & Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘The Business of War’: Google Employees Protest
Work for the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/
technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html
[https://perma.cc/3UBN-G7XX];
Daisuke
Wakabayashi & Scott Shane, Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract that Upset Employees,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagonproject-maven.html [https://perma.cc/PSY9-MKBT].
227. See John Carlo A. Villaruel, Google Employees Resign in Protest of Project Dragonfly, A
Censored Search Engine for China, TECHTIMES (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.techtimes.com/
articles/234346/20180916/google-employees-resign-in-protest-of-project-dragonfly-a-censoredsearch-engine-for-china.htm [https://perma.cc/TY72-2AVC] (describing how one employee
resigned in protest of the Dragonfly project).
228. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Erin Griffith, Amie Tsang & Kate Conger, Google Walkout:
Employees Stage Protest over Handling of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html.
[https://perma.cc/TY72-2AVC].
229. Claire Stapleton, Tanuja Gupta, Meredith Whittaker, Celie O'Neil-Hart, Stephanie
Parker, Erica Anderson & Amr Gaber, We’re the Organizers of the Google Walkout. Here Are Our
Demands, CUT (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/11/google-walkout-organizersexplain-demands.html [https://perma.cc/K9XA-MNAH].
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information about sexual harassment reports and ending mandatory
arbitration, but has rejected the governance reforms concerning the
chief diversity officer and the board.230 While Google’s reaction to the
walkouts dampened employee spirits at the company, it demonstrates
how ESG can provide a vehicle for exchange of information and
bargaining. Some of the reforms headlined at the walkouts, like ending
mandatory arbitration, became templates for other companies amidst
the ensuing #MeToo crisis.231
2. Sustainability Helps Companies Gain Government
Entities’ Trust and Inform Future Regulation
Sustainability can also help companies address information
asymmetries in their relationships with government entities, such as
regulators or local authorities. Regulators have a hard time predicting
the diverse negative repercussions of various business practices
because they do not understand the businesses as well as the companies
do.232 By committing to sustainability goals, companies undertake to
constrain their discretion in ways that align their interests more closely
with government objectives. By inviting governments to provide input
during materiality assessments, sustainability officers can reassure
their fears and satisfy their needs. Moreover, commitments to
sustainability go beyond the initial stage of requesting government
permits and obtaining approvals to last throughout the ongoing
operation of the venture.233 This is particularly important for
government, whose ability to influence the venture diminishes
once permits are issued, since monitoring is costly and not
always straightforward.
Since this process involves repeated interactions and thorough
negotiations, businesses can establish channels of communication with
government entities that can be useful throughout the venture’s
operation. Besides familiarity, these negotiations help the company
230. See Sundar Pichai, A Note to Our Employees, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/note-our-employees/
[https://perma.cc/5UPT-F5FE].
231. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 156, 204 (2019) (naming other
companies and law firms that followed Google’s lead on ending mandatory arbitration).
232. See Kenneth R. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital
Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 734 (2010) (stating that institutional structures in businesses may
prevent meaningful independent analysis).
233. See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Corporate Culture, Societal
Culture, and Institutions, 105 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 336, 336 (2015) (discussing
the importance of trust even in the presence of strong formal institutions such as
governmental authorities).
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gain the government’s trust because it can point to its many efforts to
voluntarily pursue socially desirable goals.234 In a moment of crisis, this
trust can help the company set aside suspicions about malice and build
a genuine rapport with authorities, which can help cooperation and
minimize fallout.
As disruptive technologies are opening up previously
unregulated terrains, a strategy of approaching regulators proactively
is not necessarily intuitive, as it prevents a company from taking
advantage of the latitude that comes with the lack of regulation. Yet,
many disruptors opt for that strategy in an effort to build a solid
foundation for expansion. We have discussed above Lyft’s success in
clearing its driver insurance template with regulators and contrasted it
with Uber.235 Another disruptor who opted to build relationships with
regulators is Airbnb. While Airbnb’s founders were gearing up for war
with authorities wary about its impact on their cities, its chief operating
officer, Belinda Johnson, opted for another approach.236 She noticed
that, as Airbnb’s hometown of San Francisco was considering how to
tax the practice, dozens of passionate Airbnb hosts appeared to defend
the company as a social movement helping people to belong
anywhere.237 Capitalizing on this goodwill, she suggested that Airbnb
communicate with authorities in cities around the world years before
entering these new markets.238 This message resonated with local
authorities in cities like London and Paris and allowed Airbnb to build
relationships with them before problems arose. Operating in over
190,000 cities around the world, Airbnb has managed to stay away from
crippling legal problems often arising around disruptive technology.
IV. ASSET MANAGERS, DOWNSIDE RISK, AND SUSTAINABILITY
By sourcing information from stakeholders, directors and
managers can get valuable insights into the risks facing their
companies, as we have argued above. But while ESG’s informational
advantages help justify its popularity, they do not explain why
corporate governance started shifting in that direction only in the last
decade or so. This shift is even more surprising considering that

234. See id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 190–198.
236. See Jessi Hempel, “Airbnb’s Sheryl Sandberg” Is the Valley’s Quiet Superpower, WIRED
(Jul. 13, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/07/airbnbs-sheryl-sandberg-is-the-valleysquiet-superpower/ [https://perma.cc/FA4X-H2LZ] (discussing Belinda Johnson’s career and
approach to her work at Airbnb).
237. Id.
238. Id.
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it has to overcome the ideological roadblock of shareholder
primacy’s prevailing interpretations, which are averse to
stakeholder perspectives.
In this Part, we examine why this shift is happening now and
what conditions make it possible. We argue that the drive behind ESG
results from the transformation of public firms’ shareholding
structures, which are now dominated by institutional investors, and
large asset managers in particular. These investors are more sensitive
to risk than dispersed shareholders because they cannot liquidate their
holdings as readily and are thus exposed to risks that are harder to
diversify. Seeking to mitigate these risks, large asset managers are
increasingly turning to sustainability, which offers a tool for assessing
risk and a mechanism for responding. We first link the rise of ESG
reforms within corporations to the support these reforms are receiving
from large asset managers. While socially oriented proposals have been
a mainstay of annual meetings for decades without managing to pass,
they started gaining ground when large asset managers threw their
weight behind them. We then examine their business model and argue
that it makes them more sensitive to certain risks.
A. Asset Managers as ESG Supporters
For decades, efforts for socially oriented reforms in companies
had failed to gain much traction. Social activists and religious
organizations were bringing shareholder proposals in annual meetings
with little success. Public pension funds were more likely than other
asset managers to join socially oriented coalitions for passing
shareholder proposals.239 But in recent years, the tide has been turning.
Large asset managers like BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard have
started to join these coalitions. Each of these asset managers controls,
on average, 5% to 8% of every publicly traded U.S. company, often
qualifying as the biggest shareholder.240
These large asset managers have embraced sustainability in a
very public manner, fueling public debate. In 2019, Larry Fink,
BlackRock’s CEO, declared in his annual letter to CEOs that “[s]ociety
is increasingly looking to companies, both public and private, to address
pressing social and economic issues. . . . [C]ompan[ies] [must] serve all
of its stakeholders over time – not only shareholders, but also

239. See Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina & Howard Rosenthal, Investor Ideology 22–
24 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 557, 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3119935 [https://perma.cc/8CZL-A4YW].
240. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, at 735.
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employees, customers, and communities.”241 The business community
underlined the importance of the letter as a paradigm shift for corporate
strategy.242 Board advisors emphasized that, to give shape and meaning
to Fink’s broad directive, companies ought to think through their ESG
initiatives and adherence to responsible investment values.243
BlackRock’s proclamation is highly visible, but it is hardly alone. State
Street has actively campaigned to increase diversity on boards, putting
pressure on over six hundred companies to elect more women, and did
not hesitate to vote against the reelection of directors in some cases. 244
Wondering whether these expressions of support will
materialize into a wider push for ESG reform, a growing empirical
literature explores how much impact institutional investors have had
on the ground. Overall, firms with higher institutional ownership are
more likely to also demonstrate higher performance in their
environmental and social profiles.245 To gauge asset managers’
influence, some studies examine their role in shareholder proposals.
While the number of environmental and social proposals brought has
not changed significantly throughout the 2000s, these proposals are
increasingly more likely to gain support from mutual funds and asset
managers, as well as attract a positive recommendation from

241. See Fink, supra note 16.
242. See Leslie P. Norton, BlackRock’s Larry Fink: The New Conscience of Wall Street?,
BARRON’S (June 23, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/in-defense-of-social-purpose1529716548 [https://perma.cc/QSJ2-6ULU]; Andrew Winston, Does Wall Street Finally Care About
Sustainability?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/does-wall-street-finallycare-about-sustainability [https://perma.cc/Y8QW-4VSP].
243. See Ed Batts, BlackRock Talks … and U.S. Companies Must Listen, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/13/blackrock-talksand-u-s-companies-must-listen/ [https://perma.cc/RFF5-YBNB]; Martin Lipton, Corporate
Purpose: ESG, CSR, PRI and Sustainable Long-Term Investment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 4, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/04/corporate-purpose-esgcsr-pri-and-sustainable-long-term-investment/ [https://perma.cc/E27P-UFDW]; Shaun Mathew &
Sarah Fortt, Takeaways From BlackRock’s 2018 CEO Letter, LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2018, 11:01 AM
EST),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1005956/takeaways-from-blackrock-s-2018-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/LQ6Q-UAR8].
244. See Press Release, State St. Glob. Advisors, State Street Global Advisors Reports Fearless
Girl’s Impact: More than 300 Companies Have Added Female Directors (Sept. 27, 2018, 9:16 AM
EDT),
https://newsroom.statestreet.com/press-release/corporate/state-street-global-advisorsreports-fearless-girls-impact-more-300-companie [https://perma.cc/5V35-7TVB]; see also Simon
Jessop, Investor State Street Uses Financial Clout to Get More Women to the Top, REUTERS (Mar.
8, 2018, 6:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-womens-day-state-street-uses-financialclout-to-get-more-women-to-the-top-idUSKCN1GK1MF [https://perma.cc/5LKY-5XCJ].
245. See Alexander Dyck, Karl V. Lins, Lukas Roth & Hannes F. Wagner, Do Institutional
Investors Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? International Evidence, 131 J. FIN. ECON. 693,
694 (2019).
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shareholder advisory firms like ISS.246 Moreover, firms with a higher
percentage of institutional investors known for their commitment to
ESG are more likely to receive more ESG shareholder proposals in the
first place.247 Besides shareholder proposals, asset managers and other
institutional investors communicate their priorities to management
through private engagement meetings, where ESG features
prominently on the agenda.248
The staggering growth of ESG-minded investors in recent years
is a confluence of multiple factors. Consumer demand for products
developed sustainably or ethically, or even for companies whose stances
on social issues are in line with their own priors, is undeniable.249 The
sustainability movement, however, has reached companies beyond the
consumer or retail sectors, suggesting that other forces are also at play.
Similarly, retail investors, particularly millennials, are increasingly
choosing to place their money with companies committed to ESG. 250 In
2018 alone, new ESG funds were put together by Vanguard,251 Goldman
Sachs,252 Morgan Stanley,253 Fidelity Investments,254 and many others.
246. See Yazhou Ellen He, Bige Kahraman & Michelle Lowry, ES Risks and Shareholder Voice
3 (June 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3284683 [https://perma.cc/
ZL4X-L5JJ].
247. See Erwin Eding & Bert Scholtens, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder
Proposals, 24 CORP. SOC. RESP. ENVTL. MGMT. 648, 658 (2017) (finding that “[t]he responsibility of
institutional owners of the firm positively affects the probability of receiving an environmental
shareholder proposal”).
248. See generally Elroy Dimson, Oguzhan Karakas & Xi Li, Active Ownership, 28 REV. FIN.
STUD. 3225, 3257 (2015) (finding that successful engagements in social and environmental topics
induce positive returns and improvements in operating performance and corporate governance);
Andreas G. F. Hoepner, Ioannis Oikonomou, Zacharias Sautner, Laura T. Starks & Xiao Y. Zhou,
ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside Risk (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 671, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874252 [https://perma.cc/
YF63-ZNU3] (finding that engagement on ESG issues reduces risk).
249. See Suzanne Vranica, Consumers Believe Brands Can Help Solve Societal Ills, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumers-believe-brands-can-helpsolve-societal-ills-1538478000 [https://perma.cc/LC62-WJ7W].
250. See ERNST & YOUNG, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: THE MILLENNIAL INVESTOR (2017),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investorgl/$FILE/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investor.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMG9-L4FZ].
251. Crystal Kim, Vanguard Group Goes Greener With Two ESG ETFs, BARRON’S (June 27,
2018, 12:10 PM ET), https://www.barrons.com/articles/vanguard-group-goes-greener-with-twoesg-etfs-1530115846?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/Z7T4-46G4].
252. In July 2018, Goldman Sachs partnered with Just Capital to launch its own ESG ETF,
the Goldman Sachs JUST U.S. Large Cap Equity ETF (“JUST”), which has gathered more than
$135 million in assets as of July 2020. See Historical Performance for JUST, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/just/etf-detail (last visited July 25, 2020).
253. See Steve Garmhausen, Morgan Stanley: The Case for Sustainable Investing, BARRON’S
(July 19, 2018, 4:17 PM ET), https://www.barrons.com/articles/morgan-stanley-the-case-forsustainable-investing-1531167431 [https://perma.cc/YX42-2KVN ].
254. See Tim Gray, Aiming to Do Good, Not Just Well, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/mutfund/aiming-to-do-good-not-just-well.html
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According to estimates, the total amount of assets invested in line with
ESG principles had reached, by 2018, about $22 trillion, or a quarter of
all assets under management in the world. 255 But slow-changing
demographics alone cannot justify a sudden surge in interest in the last
few years. Moreover, it is not only retail investors who have
turned to ESG, but also institutional investors, such as
university endowments.256
We argue that large asset managers support sustainability
because they understand its potential as a risk management tool and
its promise as a complement to compliance. The paragraphs below
develop our argument in further detail. We first discuss why asset
managers’ own business model, which prevents them from selling
underperforming stocks until losses deepen significantly, turns the
focus on downside risk. Even though risk is present in every
investment, we identify three types of risk that disproportionately
affect asset managers compared to retail investors: corporate crises,
hard-to-diversify risks, and externalities.
B. Why Asset Managers Are Particularly Worried About Risk
To explain why large asset managers are particularly worried
about stock price downturns, we need to briefly describe their business
model. Large asset managers control the vast majority of their holdings
through passive funds, that is, pools of assets purchased with investors’
money in order to implement a predetermined investment strategy,
such as replicating an index or following a specific industry. 257 Since the
fund’s goals are set upon its foundation, asset managers have little
flexibility in deciding, say, what stocks the fund will buy; it will buy
whatever stocks make up the index it has promised to track.258 Take the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (“DJIA”) index, which is composed of
thirty large publicly owned companies in the United States. Whereas
an active large cap fund would seek to select, say, the ten best
companies out of the DJIA thirty, a passive fund would own shares in
[https://perma.cc/NCS9-DRXW] (noting that Fidelity Investments introduced its International
Sustainability Index Fund in 2016).
255. See Amy Whyte, McKinsey: ESG No Longer Niche as Assets Soar Globally, INSTITUTIONAL
INV. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b15cc1dxds8k97/mckinsey-esgno-longer-niche-as-assets-soar-globally [https://perma.cc/R5DK-GKBZ].
256. See Samuel M. Hartzmark & Abigail B. Sussman, Do Investors Value Sustainability? A
Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows, 74 J. FIN. 2789 (2019) (finding no
difference in the choices of retail and institutional investors).
257. See Fisch et al., supra note 13, at 27.
258. See id. at 37 (“Passive funds, by their very nature, must hold both the good and bad
companies in their index.”).
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all thirty companies. The two different strategies have apparent tradeoffs. The active fund’s stock pickers would have to work harder so as to
identify the top tier of the DJIA stocks, poring over their disclosures
and conducting their own research. Their success would lie in
overperforming the DJIA thirty, but they would charge higher fees to
investors. Passive funds, in contrast, would simply buy the thirty stocks
that form the index and would even replicate the price weighing that
goes into forming it. This is a far more straightforward task, so the fees
charged are much lower.
Of course, by eschewing active stock picking, investors expose
themselves to the risk of underperforming stocks, which an active fund
might avoid, supposing that its research revealed the risks. Financially,
upside gains and downside losses are two sides of the same coin. Passive
funds, however, have a structural limitation that renders them
particularly exposed to downside risk. Their contractual commitment
to replicate an index, follow an industry, or implement a specific
strategy determines also whether they can sell a stock. Even when a
stock is underperforming the market by a significant margin, passive
funds cannot sell it as long as it remains central to their contractual
commitment.259 Thus, passive funds can remain tethered to
underperforming stocks for much longer than active funds. Of course,
accepting that some companies will underperform others is part and
parcel of investing in an index-tracking fund. After all, not all
companies can make sound business choices all the time. But there are
certain types of risks that have a significantly more profound impact on
passive funds compared to other investors, as we argue below.
C. Asset Managers Are Exposed to Risks that
Are Hard to Diversify Away
We noted above that passive funds are particularly exposed to
serious downturns in a company’s stock price because they cannot be as
nimble as other investors. To some extent, passive funds offer
protection against this risk through diversification, since they invest in
a portfolio. Yet, it is hard to diversify against risks that involve a
broader set of companies or the whole industry, and practically
impossible to diversify against market-wide, systemic risks.260 As we
argue below, recent years have witnessed an extraordinary upsurge in
259. See id. at 21 (“[Passive funds] cannot exploit mispricing or other informational
advantages through trading, nor can they follow the Wall Street Rule and exit from
underperforming companies the way traditional shareholders, particularly active funds, can.”).
260. See W. H. Wagner & S. C. Lau, The Effect of Diversification on Risk, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
48, 48–53 (1971).
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these risks, due to developments in technology, science, and politics.
Because some of these risks are at the core of sustainability
concerns, companies and investors have increasingly turned to this
corporate function.
Industry-wide risks arise when a new set of developments
affects all companies in that industry to a significant level, though not
necessarily equally. We live in an age of unprecedented industry
disruption, so examples of industry-wide reversals abound. Data
privacy and cybersecurity are risks affecting Silicon Valley
companies.261 The use of clean water resources affects all beverage
manufacturers.262 The role of fossil fuel-powered cars plagues the
automotive industry.263 Sometimes, specific corporate crises like the
ones we discussed in Section III.B above morph into industry-wide
risks, exercising pressure on all companies operating under a similar
business model. The repercussions of these crises suggest that the
industry has reached a critical juncture, at which its ability to function
in the same manner as before is in serious doubt. Arguably, the
Cambridge Analytica debacle in Facebook, with its wide reach and
political undertones, shattered any illusions the public had about data
security. Critics attacked not only Facebook, but the tech industry as a
whole.264 The Equifax data breach brought to light similar issues in the
financial industry.265 While only one company found itself at the eye of
the storm, the tidal wave hit other companies perceived to be in the
same industry and viewed as following a similar approach.266
Some crises are so potent that they engulf the whole market,
rendering diversification through alternative investment strategies

261. Tim Seymour & Ryan Dodd, Tech Stocks May Stay Under Pressure as Investors Weigh the
Data Privacy and Cybersecurity Risks, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018, 12:42 PM EST),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/27/tech-stocks-may-suffer-as-investors-weigh-the-data-privacyrisks.html [https://perma.cc/U2JJ-KCND].
262. Barbara Grady, Institutional Investors to Big Food: Come Clean on Water Risks,
GREENBIZ (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/institutional-investors-big-food-comeclean-water-risks [https://perma.cc/RA98-QZ8P].
263. See LUKE FLETCHER, KANE MARCELL & TOM CROCKER, CDP, DRIVING DISRUPTION 3 (Jan.
18, 2018), https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.
com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/953/original/CDP-autos-exec-summary-2018.pdf?
1516266755 [https://perma.cc/YN8Y-MUQD] (discussing risks to automobile manufacturers from
emissions regulations).
264. See Walker, supra note 60 (“Data has been dubbed the ‘new oil’ by many market
commentators, . . . [b]ut, as investors are finding, scandals caused by data leaks can be just as
damaging to tech behemoths as oil spills are to supermajors.”).
265. Brian Fung, Equifax’s Massive 2017 Data Breach Keeps Getting Worse, WASH. POST (Mar.
1, 2018, 9:51 AM CST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/01/equifaxkeeps-finding-millions-more-people-who-were-affected-by-its-massive-databreach/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.155fca5c1526 [https://perma.cc/3T5T-643U].
266. Id.
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much harder. The paradigmatic example is the spread of the #MeToo
movement, which overturned many a powerful executive. By now,
#MeToo has grown into a market-wide reckoning, having overturned
the careers of over four hundred executives and high-profile employees,
according to some counts. 267 Companies such as CBS, Intel, Wynn
Resorts, and Guess are only some of the household names that saw top
officers leave as a result of sexual misconduct allegations.268
But large-scale problems, one might retort, have upended
business practices since time immemorial. The turn to sustainability,
on the other hand, counts less than a decade of life. To understand why
companies have only recently started focusing on such risks through
the sustainability lens, we need to take into account the profound
change in the incentives of corporate managers and boards due to the
increasing presence of passive funds. Traditional corporate governance
mechanisms, like quarterly disclosures or annual executive
compensation, are tied to a set period, and in particular to the net profit
number at the end of that period. With few built-in incentives to
consider the long run,269 directors and officers need only focus on what
happens during their time at the helm. In large companies, the median
CEO tenure stands at five years.270 This looks like an awfully short time
to solve the problems of humanity, particularly without any extra pay.
And since all competitors are bound to be exposed to the same risk, any
failure to address it will not stand out.
In contrast, the impact of such problems on businesses has
become a salient question for asset managers who have committed to
holding significant blocks of stock on behalf of their clients. As our
interviews and roundtables with asset managers and investors have
confirmed, when a whole industry faces a major downturn, asset
managers understand very well that the inescapable implications will
reverberate through their client base.271 For some, it will be a direct hit
to their savings, but for others, it may mean prolonging their retirement
or cutting back on essentials. When the whole market is headed for a
267. See Jeff Green, #MeToo Has Implicated 414 High-Profile Executives and Employees in 18
Months, TIME (June 25, 2018, 11:49 AM EDT), http://time.com/5321130/414-executives-metoo/
[https://perma.cc/HK2F-JE74].
268. See Riley Griffin, Hannah Recht & Jeff Green, #MeToo: One Year Later, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/N9ETJ528] (reflecting on one year of #MeToo and providing a list of individuals implicated in scandals,
as well as headlines of stories covering the movement).
269. See infra Section V.A.
270. Dan Marcec, CEO Tenure Rates, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/12/ceo-tenure-rates/ [https://perma.cc/PHA3-YSAC].
271. Representatives from CalPERS, CalSTRS, BlackRock, and State Street reiterated the
unique inability for them, as passive investors, to escape systemic risks such as climate change at
the Berkeley Law CEO Letter Roundtable on November 19, 2018.

3 - Gadinis & Miazad_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1456

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

10/13/2020 4:21 PM

[Vol. 73:5:1401

reckoning, these consequences are even more severe. Asset managers
do not have the luxury of hoping that disaster will hit only after they
depart, as their clients’ horizons are decades-long. They need to
maintain client trust to ensure that capital continues to flow into their
products. In their effort to mobilize boards and managers,
sustainability is one of the most useful levers.
D. Corporate Externalities Can Hit Asset
Managers’ Other Shareholdings
Corporate law scholars have long discussed the impact of
externalities on the decisionmaking of corporate boards.272 When a
business choice benefits the corporation but harms other constituencies,
managers have strong incentives to take it nevertheless, since they are
being rewarded for increasing shareholder profits. 273 Of course, tort
doctrine seeks to force companies to internalize some harmful
consequences ex post, while legislatures and regulators have often
imposed ex ante restrictions over potentially harmful corporate activity.
Yet, as long as the probability of detection remains low, managers can
still bet strongly on misbehaving.
The core of this problem lies in the sharp distinction drawn by
corporate law between the corporate entity and its internal operation,
on the one hand, and the external world, on the other. In the
conventional understanding of the corporation, shareholders and
managers occupy a different sphere from the corporation’s other
constituencies, and problems affecting other constituencies will have
only a negligible impact on shareholders and managers, respectively.274
For example, when a company suffers an oil spill just off the coast, very
few, if any, of its shareholders are expected to reside by that coast.
Similarly, when a retail company experiences a cybersecurity breach,
few of its shareholders are likely to actually have their banking
information stolen and suffer losses due to identity fraud. With
shareholders unlikely to suffer any of the harm directed at other
constituencies, managers are motivated to benefit the former and
disregard any adverse impact to the latter.

272. See, e.g., Anthony Biglan, Corporate Externalities: A Challenge to the Further Success of
Prevention Science, 12 J. PREVENTION SCI. 1 (2011).
273. See Anthony Biglan, The Role of Advocacy Organizations in Reducing Negative
Externalities, 29 J. ORG. BEHAV. MGMT. 215, 215–30 (2009) (“[C]ompanies have no incentive to
reduce externalities, since they receive no negative consequences for producing them but likely
will experience negative ones by reducing or eliminating them.”).
274. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1987).
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This distinction between shareholders and other constituencies
collapses, at least in part, with large institutional shareholding. As
discussed above, three or four large asset managers collectively control
significant percentages, ranging between 15% and 30% on average, of
virtually every public company in the country.275 With such widespread
presence, a company’s harmful conduct is much more likely to impact
its institutional investors compared to its retail ones because it can
affect one of their other investments. To go back to our examples above,
the off-the-coast oil spill can seriously affect that state’s fisheries and
tourism industries, and the cybersecurity breach will impact retail
banks and credit card companies. In both cases, shareholders in the
affected industries will most likely include large asset managers, who
will also have a significant representation in the misbehaving
companies. For these shareholders, the losses in the harmed industries
will counterbalance the gains of corporate misconduct. It makes sense,
then, that these shareholders are supporting a shift toward
sustainability, which gives voice to constituencies previously neglected
in corporate decisionmaking. Some of these constituencies represent
other business interests of these institutional shareholders.
There is another inroad into the stark dividing line between the
company’s internal and external spheres, which goes far deeper into the
institutional shareholding business model. Asset managers’ continued
existence depends on the ongoing influx of cash flow from their clients
to their funds. Some of these clients are retail investors, while others
are specialized institutional investors, like pension funds.276 Even
though these investors have long horizons, positions get liquidated
daily. To replenish their resources and attract new funds, asset
managers need to gain new clients of at least comparable means and
convince existing clients to maintain and hopefully increase their
current level of contributions. Both these propositions would be at risk
if worsening market conditions disrupted clients’ ability to contribute.
Disruptions occur when market participants fail to grasp the full impact
of ongoing developments and the need to address them. The 2008
financial crisis was a wake-up call because it showed how Wall Street’s
short-term approach could endanger the whole financial system and set
off a worldwide recession.277 Failures of similar scale could severely
275. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, at 735.
276. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ASSET MANAGEMENT 2020: A BRAVE NEW WORLD 13 (2020),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/asset-management/publications/pdfs/pwc-asset-management-2020-abrave-new-world-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYN6-AQH6].
277. See, e.g., RIMS, THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT 4 (2009), https://community.rims.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile
.ashx?DocumentFileKey=f26b1c64-8123-4c96-9c59-83fc43bc99cb&forceDialog=0
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diminish investors’ savings, thus raising serious threats for the asset
management industry.
V. WHY ESG SHOULD BE PART OF THE BOARD’S FIDUCIARY DUTIES
We have argued that ESG helps managers address diverse risks
relating to the company’s business by obtaining information from
stakeholders that are ideally placed to understand such risks.278 While
conventional corporate governance tools like compliance tend to
antagonize internal stakeholders and exclude external ones, ESG
encourages an iterative process of negotiation that helps boards solidify
their response and build ties.279 Our portrayal of ESG helps explain its
widespread acceptance among so many different companies in such a
short amount of time.
Yet, it is still unclear how ESG fits within the board’s mandate
to monitor management. On the one hand, if the board completely
eschews any ESG considerations, it may be exposing its shareholders
to unnecessary risks that other companies have reasonably addressed,
perhaps placing its good faith in doubt. If courts agreed with this logic,
then they would recognize ESG as part of the board’s fiduciary duties.
But on the other hand, as companies are embracing ESG at a
quickening pace, it is less clear why we need the muscle of
fiduciary duties to compel boards in that direction. Even when
management happens to stall, shareholders take it upon themselves
to prod, either privately through engagement or publicly through
shareholder proposals.
Courts invoke fiduciary duties to resolve agency conflicts
between shareholders and managers.280 Below, we claim that managers’
and directors’ incentives are not necessarily in line with shareholders’
interests as far as ESG is concerned.281 ESG’s key outcome, preventing
a crisis, is hard to measure because it lacks a manifestation. Thus, it
does not work well with governance mechanisms designed to reward
net earnings increases and encourage risk-taking. This fundamental
problem is compounded by two additional complications. First,
managers and directors may not be aware of an ESG challenge, even
[https://perma.cc/RNH3-KZCF] (noting that, leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, “individuals
on the front line who were taking—and trading in—these risks ostensibly were rewarded for shortterm profit alone”).
278. See supra Part II.
279. See supra Part III.
280. See generally Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991) (connecting fiduciary
duties to failures in principal/agent models).
281. See infra Section V.A.
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though they need to expend resources to spot problems they may not be
incentivized to solve. Second, some of the issues that ESG addresses,
like climate change or diversity, are complex societal challenges in
which a single company’s contributions may feel like a drop in the
bucket. Thus, measuring results is not straightforward without
first operationalizing specific commitments, which requires effort
and resources.
Based on this analysis, we argue that courts should recognize
ESG as an essential part of boards’ monitoring mission. 282 We first
explore the misalignment of incentives between managers and
shareholders with regard to ESG in order to identify the failures that
can arise. Because these are mostly information-gathering failures, we
propose a mechanism which would furnish this information to the
board, allowing it to fulfill its monitoring mission more effectively. Once
obtaining this information, we propose that boards should be free
to fashion the most appropriate response according to their
business judgment.
A. ESG at the Core of Agency Conflicts
Between Shareholders and Managers
1. Averting a Crisis Is a Thankless Job:
Misaligned Incentives Due to the Nature of ESG Problems
When ESG operates as a crisis prevention tool, its success lies in
helping the company avoid turbulence. From the shareholders’ vantage
point, the company simply looks like it is operating smoothly,
undisturbed by ESG challenges. This might be because the company
runs an effective ESG program that successfully identifies and
neutralizes problems, or simply because no problem has arisen yet by
happenstance. For shareholders, distinguishing between the two
hypotheses is impossible until a real crisis occurs to put the company’s
readiness to the test. Due to the nature of risk prevention, it is hard for
shareholders to monitor companies effectively.
This opacity raises many challenges for managers in either
scenario. If managers choose to invest in ESG, they will have difficulty
convincing shareholders that it was a worthwhile effort. They may try
to present to shareholders the implications of an impending crisis had
282. For example, in the aftermath of the Wells Fargo accounting fraud scandal, regulators
were concerned about similar practices in other banks, which scrambled to review their processes.
See Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Isn’t the Only Bank with Fake Accounts, Regulators Say, CNN MONEY
(June 6, 2018, 1:53 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/06/news/companies/wells-fargo-fakeaccounts-banks-occ/index.html [https://perma.cc/WUA3-PRNW].
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they not acted earlier, though hypothesizing about counterfactuals is
hardly persuasive. Perhaps they can take advantage of a crisis hitting
another company and explain how they were better able to avoid it. But
these opportunities are rare and require a certain degree of
imagination. None of these arguments sound like a winning strategy for
managers that want to get a pay raise. Managers would have to find
comfort in the thought that, had the crisis not been averted, getting said
pay raise would be even harder.
Imagine now that managers make the opposite choice, that is,
not to invest in ESG. Let’s assume that they understand that, as a
result, their company is more vulnerable to a crisis. Still, it is hard to
predict when this crisis is going to hit their company. With respect to
some ESG issues, the crisis might hit immediately, such as in the
#MeToo context. But the chances that a company will face a #MeToo
problem in a given year are lower than the chances that it will face such
a problem in, say, the next three years, or five, or ten. In contrast,
executive compensation is calculated on an annual basis.283 Managers
may simply decide to take their chances, redirecting resources away
from ESG and towards efforts that help raise their company’s
profitability immediately or with higher certainty. After all, the median
CEO tenure is only five years or so.284
This misalignment of incentives between managers and
shareholders is further compounded when the problem at hand is multifaceted and calls for coordinated actions by companies and governments
on many fronts. Climate change is the paradigmatic example of such a
huge challenge. A single company’s actions, while necessary to produce
an effective outcome, are only an infinitesimal aspect of the problem.285
Addressing such problems cannot start without breaking them down
into smaller issues, exploring different solutions, and negotiating with
various stakeholders. All these steps increase the cost of undertaking
action against climate change for each company, all while the impact of
climate change remains decades away.

283. See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25–29 (2004) (explaining how annual
incentives around compensation and director reelection affect boards’ review).
284. See Dan Marcec, CEO Tenure Drops to Just 5 Years, EQUILAR (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.equilar.com/blogs/351-ceo-tenure-drops-to-five-years.html [https://perma.cc/2MYG9FV8].
285. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 179 (2017) (“Private corporate initiatives will often
not be complete solutions, but seeking a panacea, as we have seen, can often lead to worse results
than seeking multiple partial solutions.”).
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2. Insularity and Blind Spots: Imperfect Monitoring
In addition to features inherent in ESG risks, characteristics of
CEOs and directors also hinder efforts to gather information and
develop a response. More specifically, CEOs overconfident about their
abilities and dedicated to their vision about the company tend to
underestimate risks associated with failure.
Overconfidence is one of the key traits analyzed in a growing
literature in corporate finance, which relies on insights from social and
experimental psychology to identify and understand managerial biases.
The starting point for this research is the extraordinary position that
CEOs have attained in American culture. Figures such as Elon Musk,
Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and Jamie Dimon often appear on popular
media and make headlines with their statements and actions.286 In the
last decade, CEOs like Steve Jobs, Larry Page, Sergei Brin, and Larry
Ellison occupied a similar high mark.287 The archetypal portrait of a
CEO emerging from these examples is that of a widely admired genius
acutely aware of her own achievements, and often accused of
overconfidence when flawed decisions emerge.
Journalists, investors, and academic researchers have been
alternately fascinated and disillusioned with overconfident CEOs.
Some draw a link between overconfidence and the out-of-the-box
thinking that drives innovation and competitiveness.288 Yet, seminal
studies in this field have linked CEO overconfidence to practices that
destroy value for shareholders, such as a higher tendency to undertake
mergers, paying out smaller dividends, overestimating future earnings,
and practicing less conservative accounting.289 But there is little

286. See, e.g., Niraj Choksi & Eric A. Taub, Elon Musk Is Cleared in Lawsuit over His ‘Pedo
Guy’ Tweet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/business/elon-muskdefamation-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/79WH-Y2L7]; Ben Hubbard & Michael Schwirtz, Bezos
Phone Hack Tied to Saudi Crown Prince Puts New Pressure on Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/world/middleeast/bezos-phone-hacked.html
[https://perma.cc/2QQ4-LB7R]; Aimee Ortiz, JPMorgan Chase C.E.O. Says It Needs to Do More to
Tackle Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/business/JamieDimon-racism-chase.html [https://perma.cc/95WV-UDRY]; Aaron Sorkin, An Open Letter to Mark
Zuckerberg, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/opinion/aaronsorkin-mark-zuckerberg-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/9G2C-DYSW].
287. See generally Matthew L.A. Hayward, Violina P. Rindova & Timothy G. Pollock, Believing
One’s Own Press: The Causes and Consequences of CEO Celebrity, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 637
(2004) (exploring how CEOs became media favorites); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate,
Superstar CEOs, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1593 (2009) (arguing that superstardom leads to bad decisions).
288. See Alberto Galasso & Timothy S. Simcoe, CEO Overconfidence and Innovation, 57 MGMT.
SCI. 1469 (2011) (linking overconfidence to devoting efforts to innovation).
289. See generally Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey S. Tate, Behavioral CEOs: The Role of
Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 37 (2015) (providing an overview of the literature
in corporate finance spurred by their seminal article on CEO overconfidence).
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disagreement that overconfidence is pronounced among CEOs, as
evidence from their stock options suggests that they fail to diversify and
maintain their investment within their companies for much longer than
rationally expected.290 To understand why managerial overconfidence
is so widespread, some researchers have pointed to the CEO selection
process, arguing that CEOs got their jobs due to their superior
performance compared to peers, which they would not have achieved
without increased risk aversion.291
Since managerial overconfidence leads to a willingness to
tolerate increased risks, it can affect how CEOs react to ESG-related
concerns in many ways. To start, overconfident CEOs tend to
underestimate the force with which ESG challenges can hit their
company. They believe deeply in the positive transformations that their
companies are bringing to society and do not want to see their
achievements marred by negative associations. Overconfident CEOs
are dedicated to their vision and are not concerned about information
specific to projects which might interfere with this vision.292 Due to this
preoccupation, managers’ perspective can become insular and selfabsorbed, discounting outside signals.293
But even if they can understand the importance of ESG
considerations, overconfident CEOs will tend to overestimate their
company’s and their own ability to withstand a crisis.294 In essence, they
believe that their company’s achievements come with so much goodwill
that they can overcome negative events virtually unscathed. Other
companies may have been humbled by similar crises, but not theirs.
When managers start believing their own press, hubris quickly sets
in.295 They believe that they can rewrite the rulebook,296 coming up with
innovative responses that will help them succeed where other
companies have failed.
290. See id. at 40–42.
291. See Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate
Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737 (2008) (arguing that overconfidence increases the likelihood of making
high-risk and high-return business choices).
292. See id. at 2739 (arguing that the overconfident CEO “invests in a project even when her
positive information about the project is such that she would not invest if she were rational”).
293. See Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief
Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351,
357–58 (2007).
294. See MIKE WILSON, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOD AND LARRY ELLISON (1997) (exploring
the effect of Ellison’s outsize personality on Oracle).
295. See Hayward et al., supra note 287, at 649.
296. See, e.g., Peter Elkind, The Trouble with Steve, CNN MONEY (Mar. 5, 2008, 1:03 PM EST),
https://money.cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies/elkind_jobs.fortune/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z4AS-97RG] (“Jobs likes to make his own rules, whether the topic is computers,
stock options, or even pancreatic cancer.”).
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These dynamics may inhibit managers from understanding the
breadth of ESG factors that can affect their companies, either in full or
in part. Because ESG concerns are vastly different from each other, a
company that is particularly alert to one issue may be blindsided by
another. For example, Facebook scored high on environmental issues,
while disregarding privacy issues. 297 Even companies for whom
sustainability has been a central motivation can find themselves
embroiled in ESG crises on a different issue.298
Although the literature on overconfidence highlights CEOs’
decisionmaking propensities, corporate law has established boards of
directors as a check to counterbalance CEOs. One can imagine that
some directors are more attune to social developments than visiondriven executives, perhaps due to individual circumstances. In
aggregate, however, most directors’ qualifications are unlikely to have
much to do with ESG, rendering them ill-prepared to pick up early
signals of discontent across a broad array of topics. In the next Section,
we discuss how this systematic bias hampers successful handling of
social risk.
3. Ill-Equipped for ESG: Personal Background and Ideology
For many decades, corporate boards were provided with a clearcut mandate to maximize profits for shareholders, widely interpreted
as leaving no space for considering other stakeholders’ interests.
Regardless of whether these interpretations were excessively
prohibitive from a doctrinal perspective, in practice boards avoided
seeking other stakeholders’ perspectives.
This normative orientation affected not only the decisions board
members took once appointed, but also the selection process for their
appointment. Directors were picked on the basis of skills that would
assist them in monitoring whether managers maximized returns for
shareholders. Some academics connect the rise of independent directors
with a desire to induce market-oriented discipline over management.299
Many directors in U.S. public companies are or have been CEOs in other
companies, have an industry or finance background, or have training in
law or accounting. These qualifications do not necessarily prepare them
297. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 285, at 211–12; supra text accompanying
notes 177–185.
298. See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Disrupters, NEW YORKER (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/the-tech-industrys-gender-discriminationproblem [https://perma.cc/PR83-LRL3 ] (discussing Tesla’s gender problems).
299. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (arguing that
independent directors are more sensitive to stock price information).
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for grasping the full extent of certain ESG risks. Some ESG concerns
and strategies, like those related to climate change, are clearer to those
with a scientific background in this area. Other ESG concerns, like
diversity, are linked to personal experiences. Generalist board members
will find it harder to master the nuances and sensitivities associated
with many ESG issues. The company would benefit from board
members that are able to break down problems convincingly and steer
management toward a proper response.
The need for improving boards’ ESG competence has become a
priority for investors pushing for sustainability. In 2018, BlackRock
made clear that it “expects the whole board to have demonstrable
fluency in how climate risk affects the business and management’s
approach to adapting the long-term strategy and mitigating the risk.”300
Similarly, in 2016, State Street issued a Climate Change Risk
Oversight Framework for Directors, which sets out its expectations for
board members to evaluate climate risk and preparedness.301 Pension
funds like CalPERS and CalSTRS are sounding a similar rallying cry
for climate competency on boards.302
In addition to building up skills and qualifications, managers
and directors have to contend with the radical shift in thinking that
ESG represents. Reversing course after decades of established
conventional wisdom is not easy, and skepticism toward ESG is
widespread in corporate America. Early ESG proponents witnessed
firsthand the obstinate reluctance of U.S. directors and officers to take
ESG considerations into account, believing them to be contrary to their
fiduciary duties.303 Board advisors such as law firms and consultancies
have penned extensive memos to convince their clients that they can
adopt ESG measures without risking a shareholder challenge.304
The roadblocks discussed above help explain why, even as the
public discourse over sustainability is gaining salience and
shareholders are lending their support, directors and managers may
300. See BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: ENGAGEMENT PRIORITIES FOR
2018 (2018).
301. See ST. STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 104, at 1 (“State Street Global Advisors
(SSGA) believes that boards should regard climate change as they would any other significant risk
to the business and ensure that a company’s assets and its long-term business strategy are
resilient to the impacts of climate change.”).
302. See CERES, supra note 92, at 7, 15 (arguing that “[c]limate competent boards” and
“[s]ustainability strategies” is “the language of investors today,” including “California’s biggest
public pension funds”).
303. Interview with Tim Youmans, Hermes Inv. Mgmt. (Dec. 13, 2018).
304. Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has argued for companies to embrace
ESG in what he calls “The New Paradigm.” See MARTIN LIPTON, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE NEW
PARADIGM (2016), https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BDC3-HAW2].
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still be disinclined to back ESG. Below, we present our proposal for
overcoming these hurdles.
B. A Duty to Set Up an ESG Process: Standard of Conduct
Our goal is to ensure that the board identifies and understands
the ESG risks threatening its business and gathers appropriate
information through a functioning ESG process. We envisage boards’
main obligation as establishing an operational ESG mechanism that
would evolve around two key pillars: internal governance and outreach
to stakeholders.
The internal governance framework is necessary in order to
manage the information-gathering process and present results to the
board. Many companies have voluntarily set up internal ESG
governance frameworks, providing a blueprint for this effort. Typically,
the first step consists of identifying the officer(s) responsible for leading
it. This might entail hiring an entirely new ESG head or having
multiple officers with different expertise working under the supervision
of an existing top executive, such as the chief financial officer or the
chief legal officer. The main task for the internal governance framework
is to identify key ESG concerns for the company and put together a
proposal for how to monitor these areas and contact relevant
stakeholders. Once it completes its information gathering, the ESG
function will present the results to the board and propose action
where appropriate.
Outreach to stakeholders is an essential step of the ESG
information-gathering process. We do not envisage that the company
ought to respond to all comments it receives or that it ought to take
steps addressing all issues brought to its attention. Its ESG function
can prioritize concerns, identify areas in need of immediate
intervention, and propose responses to the board. It may decide to
investigate certain issues further or simply express why it has decided
to put a certain issue at the bottom of its priorities. The goal of the
proposed duty is to open channels of communication between the
company and a hitherto unexplored group of actors that are closely
following its trajectory. Responding to information that reaches the
board through this channel will come to be assessed under the board’s
duty of care, as explained below.
C. Failing to Set Up an ESG Process: Standard of Review
For our proposal to have bite, it is essential that directors and
officers are subject to liability for failing to develop their ESG function.
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This failure, we argue, can sit squarely within Delaware’s current
jurisprudence on fiduciary duties, particularly as it relates to the
concept of good faith. In Delaware fiduciary duty law, directors’ and
officers’ good faith is a key criterion for the dividing line between the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.305 As long as the board is acting in
good faith—that is, it believes that it is acting in the best interests of
the shareholders—it is not at fault for pursuing the course of action of
its choice, however catastrophic the outcome;306 it need only prove that
it took good care in considering the options before it. 307 In contrast, if
the board knowingly or recklessly disregards the interests of the
shareholders, then it does not show the loyalty required by its
relationship to them.308 Our proposal is grounded in this understanding
of good faith, which permeates Delaware case law on fiduciary duties.
Below, we articulate a test that companies must satisfy in order to fulfill
this duty and explain why, despite its radical implications, this test
mirrors approaches Delaware courts have been using continuously
for decades.
We argue that, given what we know about the role of ESG in
limiting risk, a board that completely fails to operationalize
sustainability is simply exposing its shareholders to much greater risk
than they would otherwise have faced. When a company’s management
declines to inquire how female employees are treated in the workplace,
it allows pernicious behaviors to flourish. When a company’s
environmental efforts simply try to meet legal limits long decried as
inadequate by environmentalists, the company may find itself exposed
when these environmentalists are proven right and catastrophe hits.
Completely disregarding these concerns should not be a viable option
for boards of publicly traded companies, since overcoming any resulting
crisis will be extremely costly for their shareholders. Thus, developing
an ESG function and providing the company with a mechanism for early
risk discovery and prevention is an imperative for directors and officers,
who should find themselves in bad faith if they fail to act.

305. See Leo E. Strine et al., supra note 78, at 633 (“[G]ood faith has long been used as the key
element in defining the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.”).
306. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387
N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that corporate directors are afforded protection of the
business judgment rule even where their business choices may be negligent).
307. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (“Thus, a director's duty to
exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a
duty of loyalty.”).
308. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (affirming the
Court of Chancery’s application of a bad faith standard that required a showing of “intentional
dereliction of duty [and] a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”).
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How the board treats the information that reaches it through
the sustainability function should remain its prerogative, provided it
shows due care in considering the information. Our proposal does not
seek to force the board to act in a particular way or to respond to every
concern that the company receives from aggrieved parties through the
stakeholder grapevine. The board should remain free to reach its own
judgment, provided it receives adequate information about these
concerns. After all, the board can decide the resources it chooses to
invest in sustainability, depending on the severity of the risks it hopes
to mitigate.
One might worry that, barring an affirmative obligation to
respond, boards can simply go through the ESG process performatively
without making any essential change on the ground. While these
concerns are valid, we believe they are also premature. By broadening
the board’s horizons, ESG also removes any constraints imposed by
profit maximization and embraces courses of action previously thought
as precluded. Moreover, by highlighting the risks arising out of the
social implications of company actions, our proposal would make a
business case for ESG, aligning it squarely with boards’ core
competencies. Just as with other business opportunities, boards remain
accountable to shareholders for missing them. Our proposal further
enhances this accountability because it creates a written record of the
board’s information and deliberations, available to public scrutiny in
case of a trial.
Even though our proposal opens up the boardroom to
considerations outside the current mainstay of corporate law, it adopts
a process already familiar to practitioners and thoroughly monitored by
courts. Corporate law scholars will recognize in our proposal some
similarities with the In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation (“Caremark”) framework that governs corporate compliance,
discussed above,309 as well as some distinct differences. Similar to
Caremark’s first prong, which requires boards to set up a process for
monitoring employees’ legal violations, our proposal requires boards to
set up a process for overseeing social risks arising out of companies’
operations. Delaware courts have a long track record of assessing
boards’ compliance with Caremark’s first prong. Traditionally, courts
examined indicators such as rulebooks, staffing, and training, and more
recently have delved deeper into how companies are integrating
compliance in their operations. Moreover, courts have explored how
information about legal violations reaches boards. Thus, the framework
we envisage for ESG borrows many ideas from compliance, which it
309. See supra Section II.A.
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applies to issues outside compliance’s ambit. Delaware courts should
have little difficulty operationalizing it.
Where our proposal deviates from Caremark is with regard to
the response we expect from boards when addressing ESG concerns.
Under Caremark’s second prong, once the company’s compliance system
informs the board of employee misconduct, the board ought to respond
appropriately to the red flag based on the information before it.310 We
do not envisage any similar requirements for directors and officers who
are considering whether to support a sustainability initiative or
whether to take ESG into account as one of the factors determining
their ultimate choice on a business quandary before them. It is
impossible to separate ESG as a factor in this decision from all the other
factors going into it and then to request distinct action.
D. How Our Proposal Compares to Alternatives
1. Why Not Simply Expand the Caremark Framework?
A new wave of thinking on compliance centers around corporate
culture as the defining element of effectiveness. 311 Responding to
criticisms of compliance reviews and investigations as highly legalistic
tools that fail to identify serious misconduct, this new wave of
compliance efforts seeks to broaden its reach beyond a sterile
enforcement and deterrence mechanism.312 It aspires to reconceptualize
compliance as a collective commitment to ethical values that will steer
individual employee behavior away from illegality. In its reliance on
peer pressure and socialization, the emphasis on corporate culture
borrows a lot from behavioral and social sciences.313 It brings ethics and
compliance closer together conceptually.314 Regulators and companies
alike are embracing this new direction. The DOJ has been emphasizing
“tone at the top”—that is, mission statements by top executives in favor
310. For a discussion of Caremark’s second prong, see Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 125, at
2168–80.
311. See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 936, 954–55 (arguing that “[c]ulture is crucial
to compliance”).
312. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 952–54
(2009) (“Given the expanding scholarly interest in New Governance regimes, it is useful to consider
how a ‘true’ New Governance compliance regime might alter the firm’s relationship with
government actors, as well as the internal relationships between the firm’s compliance personnel
and its managers and employees.”).
313. See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 947 (arguing that the “case for optimism about the
possibility of corporate cultural change has a solid academic pedigree” arising from “behavioral
ethics and other contemporary social sciences research”).
314. See Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and Ethics: Toward an Objective Business Compliance
Function, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 581 (2018).
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of complying with the law—for quite some time.315 Its guidelines now
officially refer to “compliance and ethics” programs. Companies are
responding by creating distinct chief ethics officers whose mandate
extends beyond simply illegal conduct. According to recent commentary,
the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Marchand v. Barnhill,316 which
emphasizes the board’s good faith in addition to illegality, also draws
heavily on how the board perceives its core mission in connection to
core values in the company’s products, such as food safety for ice
cream makers.317
Perhaps heartened by this shift, some academics propose to take
this a step further. Some would like to expand compliance’s scope to
include socially harmful conduct more broadly.318 They argue that the
short-term perspectives clouding managers’ and directors’ judgment, as
we have discussed above, also affect their compliance choices. Viewing
the current Caremark framework as too lax for meaningful review, they
call for a more stringent fiduciary standard. Other proposals emphasize
the role of criminal enforcement in strengthening compliance and would
elevate compliance culture into a key consideration in corporate crime
sanctions, asking judges to balance it against the need to punish. 319
The increasing importance of corporate culture in regulatory
policy and companies’ growing engagement with ethics are definitely
moving in the direction that we are proposing and have reinforced
interest in sustainability. ESG and ethics represent companies’ efforts
to self-regulate in the wake of the realization that a simple divide
between legal and illegal activity is failing to serve shareholders’
interests. Both moves respond by placing values front and center,
hoping to inspire individuals rather than deter them.
Where ESG has an edge over a broader appeal to culture or
ethics is in its bottom-up, grassroots approach. Neither compliance

315. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)-(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004)
(“To have an effective compliance and ethics program . . . an organization shall . . . promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with
the law.”).
316. 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
317. See Pollman, supra note 47, at 2024–25 (“As the ice cream manufacturer makes only a
single product, the court noted that food safety is a central compliance issue for the company and
the complaint therefore created a reasonable inference that the ‘dearth of any board-level effort at
monitoring’ was a conscious failure.”).
318. See Armour et al., supra note 46, at 47, 51–52 (arguing that because “the bar for
monitoring obligations is so low”—i.e., plaintiffs must prove that the company had no compliance
system whatsoever—courts “restrict themselves to defining egregious malpractice, as opposed to
providing any guidance on good practice”).
319. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507 (2018) (arguing that corporate character should play a more
important part in judicial considerations).
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culture nor corporate ethics come with any specific proposal for how
managers and directors are going to identify the values that ought to be
guiding their choices. In comparison, ESG’s defining feature is a turn
to stakeholders as a way of mapping unwanted implications of the
company’s choices. By looking to stakeholders, ESG has managed to
transform the abstract concept of ethical conduct into an operational
framework where impact can be charted, measured, and improved. At
the same time, ESG’s approach helps corporations boost their
legitimacy with the public, ensuring that companies’ actions track
broader societal concerns. Through the ESG channel, companies are not
left to decide for themselves what is ethical, but can draw on feedback
from affected parties, as well as benefit from input from other
companies, the academic community, or even global developments.
2. Why Is Disclosure Not Enough?
Most companies already engaging in sustainability choose to
make some form of disclosure about their efforts.320 Some of them issue
a comprehensive corporate responsibility or sustainability report, while
others prefer to issue stand-alone reports about specific initiatives.321
Typically, these documents are not part of the official reports submitted
to the SEC in accordance with federal securities laws’ requirements. In
an effort to organize this information in a manner immediately
approachable to investors, standard setters have set rules for assessing
each company’s effort and have proposed metrics for ESG
engagement.322 In addition, asset managers are coming up with their
own ways of appraising each company’s ESG credentials in order
to create investment products that encompass only the most
committed companies.323
Fostering this dynamic has been a key goal of recent legislative
actions by policymakers around the world. The European Union already
has in place a mandatory sustainability-disclosure directive.324 In the
320. See Kwon, supra note 5.
321. See id. at 27–33 (examining sustainability reporting practices across companies in the
S&P 500).
322. See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 944
(2019) (noting that because sustainability disclosure is currently happening on a voluntary basis,
there have been efforts by “global standard setters seeking to promulgate disclosure standards
or guidelines”).
323. There are various ESG data providers, including well-known financial news firms such
as Bloomberg, MSCI, and the Dow Jones Co. For a discussion of the resulting confusion for
investors, see Kristin Broughton, Which Are the Most Ethical Companies? Good Luck Figuring
that Out, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2019, 8:32 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/which-are-themost-ethical-companies-good-luck-figuring-that-out-11561379528 [https://perma.cc/9QYE-XXN6].
324. Kwon, supra note 5, at 11.
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United States, the SEC is considering whether to demand
sustainability disclosure from companies,325 as market and scholarly
proposals are advocating.326 Even the Delaware legislature, in a rare
foray into disclosure, passed the Certification of Adoption of
Transparency and Sustainability Standards Act in October 2018.327
Under this Act, companies can receive a certification from Delaware
provided they formulate and adopt a set of standards by which they
commit to abide and make those standards public.328
Yet, we argue, disclosure is unlikely to accomplish, on its own,
the transformation that sustainability’s proponents yearn for.
Disclosure focuses on facts, typically of the recent past. In
sustainability’s case, examples would include priorities that the
company has set and actions that the company is currently
undertaking. Yet, these disclosed priorities and actions say nothing
about what the company is not acting upon. It provides us with no
insight into what stakeholders’ real concerns are, whether they were
communicated to the board, and why the board rejected them.
Disclosure provides us with only the board’s reading of its sustainability
needs and its current response, without any basis on which to assess
their adequacy. Disclosure is geared towards deterring the board from
lying, but it puts no pressure on the board to get it right by expanding
efforts to eliminate blind spots.
Disclosure does not have a particularly good track record in
holding companies accountable for failing to address risks, because
future calamities are innately imprecise. Companies have been
disclosing risks to their financial condition for decades. 329 These risk
disclosures operate as a means to limit company liability for plans or
projections that do not pan out because they explain to investors factors
that may set the company off its course. Their function is to introduce
uncertainty to the company’s other disclosures, thus making the claim
of a misstatement much harder to prove.330 Sometimes, companies also
disclose measures to mitigate these risks, and they may be found liable
if these measures’ effectiveness proves lower than described. But, in
325. Fisch, supra note 322, at 939–40.
326. See id. at 952 (proposing that “the SEC implement a new disclosure requirement of
sustainability discussion and analysis as part of Regulation S—K”).
327. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5000E-5008E (effective Oct. 1, 2018).
328. Id.
329. For a discussion of the usefulness of these disclosures, see John L. Campbell, Hsinchun
Chen, Dan S. Dhaliwal, Hsin-min Lu & Logan B. Steele, The Information Content of Mandatory
Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396 (2014) (finding that
companies facing greater risks include more extensive disclosures).
330. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481,
482–84 (1994).
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sustainability’s case, no such yardstick is likely to be available to
litigants because no promises about the effectiveness of sustainability
can be made.
CONCLUSION
Corporate vilification is undoubtedly in vogue. Attacks on “big
corporations” are dominating the political debate.331 From Senator
Warren’s Stop Wall Street Looting Act,332 which targets private equity,
to Senator Harris’s EMPOWER Act,333 which mandates gender pay
equity, we are in the midst of a regulatory arms race to rein in corporate
power. It is not just the Democrats either. President Trump, who
blatantly favors his base over “Corporate America,” has made a habit
out of hurling Twitter attacks at American darlings from GM to Harley
Davidson.334 He followed up by drafting an executive order against
“Tech Giants” who are, according to him, biased against
conservatives.335 Crucially, these messages are resonating with voters,
with each attack drawing crescendoing cheers and millions of “likes”
from Americans across the political spectrum.336 Millennials and
GenXers, who feel the burden of climate change as an existential crisis,
are also demanding that businesses act responsibly.337 And major asset

331. See Ursula Perano, Big Business Becomes Boogeyman at 1st Democratic Debate, AXIOS,
https://www.axios.com/first-democratic-debates-big-business-elizabeth-warren-02fcb7f7-7b614e19-9e5b-7d98936578d2.html (last updated Jun. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3MNF-GN4T].
332. Stop Wall Street Looting Act, S. 2155, 116th Cong. (2019).
333. EMPOWER Act, S. 2988, 115th Cong. (2018).
334. See Krishnadev Calamur, Uneasy Riders: Trump’s War on Harley, ATLANTIC (June 26,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/trump-harley-davidson/563729/
[https://perma.cc/AT9Q-B7GF].
335. See Margaret Harding McGill & Daniel Lippman, White House Drafting Executive Order
to Tackle Silicon Valley’s Alleged Anti-conservative Bias, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:07 PM EDT),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/07/white-house-tech-censorship-1639051
[https://perma.cc/X5PV-HAJQ].
336. See Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/sensanders (last visited
July 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UC69-JXL9]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ (last visited July 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LTD5-TP5V];
Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/SenWarren (last visited July 25,
2020) [https://perma.cc/74M2-RPDB].
337. See Matthew Ballew, Jennifer Marlon, Seth Rosenthal, Abel Gustafson, John Kotcher,
Edward Maibach & Anthony Leiserowitz, Do Younger Generations Care More About Global
Warming?,
YALE
PROGRAM
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
COMM.
(June
11,
2019),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/do-younger-generations-care-more-aboutglobal-warming/ [https://perma.cc/38DW-833Y].
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managers and investors are asking companies to articulate a social
purpose that goes beyond profit.338
It would be a mistake—and a lost opportunity—for corporate law
to dismiss this distrust of corporations as political jockeying, mere
whims of a generation that will outgrow its idealism, or hollow demands
of asset managers who are confused about their fiduciary
responsibilities. The focus on short-term profits has produced
externalities that are becoming harder and harder to dismiss. In
moments like this, academics have historically stepped up to reimagine
corporate purpose. In the 1930s, it was Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
who argued for a socially conscious articulation of corporate purpose,
triggering the sweeping regulation of the Roosevelt Era.339 And Milton
Friedman entered the stage during a slump in the economy in the
1970s, an ideal moment for him to influence the deregulation of the
Reagan Era.340 Today, we find ourselves at another inflection point.
Mounting global challenges—from climate change and shifting energy
sources, to disruptive technologies and social media, and even changing
demographics—call for us to reimagine both the marketplace and
the demos.
It is tempting to cast corporations as the villains in this future,
locked in a perennial game of cat and mouse with legislatures,
regulators, and law enforcement authorities. In this scenario,
corporations are constantly seeking to evade current laws, exploit
unregulated terrains for their own benefit, or force unequal bargains to
struggling communities and disadvantaged groups. The law has no
option but to chase after the corporate perpetrator in as many ways as
it can and with as many resources as it can muster.
While this portrayal may still be accurate for many corporations,
our research shows that a good number of companies are moving away
from it because management, directors, and shareholders are realizing
that it does not make business sense. Instead, ESG envisages
corporations not simply as efficient production mechanisms, but as a
mini-social laboratories where relationships between stakeholders are
constantly evolving in the face of newly mounting challenges. From an
aggregate social perspective, these laboratories are essential because

338. See Fink, supra note 14 (call from BlackRock CEO Larry Fink for other CEOs to consider
“[a] new model for corporate governance”).
339. See, e.g., Andrew Smith, Kevin D. Tennent & Jason Russell, Berle and Means’s The
Modern Corporation and Private Property: The Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model of Corporate
Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 535, 548 (2019).
340. See Peter S. Goodman, A Fresh Look at the Apostle of Free Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/weekinreview/13goodman.html [https://perma.cc/
8QQC-CU3X].
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they are the first line of defense against major societal issues. They
propose solutions that thrive in the microcosm of the workplace in a
way that would be hard to imagine for policymakers looking at the
world from the heights of their legislative chambers. They mobilize
resources and utilize dynamics that are simply hard to engage in the
broad-brush approach of statutes and regulations. They are nimbler in
aligning with social trends, altering the enforcement landscape
with minor changes in the legal one, as is the case with the
#MeToo movement.341
Ten years ago, this second scenario might have sounded overly
optimistic, but today many companies are moving in this direction, as
we have shown above. This shift is due to the combined forces of a
rapidly evolving marketplace that constantly generates new
relationships and new challenges, a change in shareholding structure
that emphasizes risks, and a favorable social climate that rewards good
corporate behavior. Of course, corporations alone cannot address
society’s most pressing problems. Yet, it is hard to imagine any solution
to these problems that does not entail a change in corporate behavior.
Such a change, cynics believe, can only come through the force of
external regulation.
We disagree. We show that companies have many incentives to
bring about this change on their own, and we illustrate how corporate
governance can reinforce these incentives even further. We argue that
corporate law’s age-old ideological fights, or neat divisions between
public and private spheres and between legal risk and business risk, do
not need to stand in the way. ESG has honed a novel approach to inform
boards about risks arising from the impact of their operations on third
parties, which companies had previously failed to fully understand.
Obtaining and assessing this information should be among all directors’
and officers’ duties. But corporate law should free boards’ hands to
decide how best to address the implications.

341. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
4,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html
[https://perma.cc/39WR-8LAK]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, and Where
It’s
Going,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
24,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2019/03/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/ [https://perma.cc/FUQ9-8JT5].
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TABLE 1: INTERVIEWS
Participant Name & Title

Date

Allison Bennington,
Chief Legal Officer, ValueAct Capital

September 20, 2018

Verity Chegar,
Vice President, ESG Strategist, BlackRock
Rob Chesnut,
Chief Ethics Officer, Airbnb
Brenden Corbett,
Associate, Global Investment Research, Goldman Sachs
Silvia Garrigo,
Vice President, Corporate Responsibility and
Social Investment, Millicom
Jim Hawley,
Head of ESG Research, TruValue Labs
Bob Hirth,
Sr. Managing Director, Protiviti, Vice Chair, Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), Chairman Emeritus,
COSO
Courteney Keatinge,
Senior Director, ESG Research, Glass Lewis

October 11, 2019

Nashat Moin,
Senior ESG Analyst, Wells Fargo
Chris Power,
Senior Manager, Technical Accounting & SEC
Reporting, Salesforce
Laura Stein,
Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Clorox
Corporation
Tim Youmans,
Engagement Director, Hermes Investment Management

December 6, 2019

October 11, 2019
December 6, 2019
March 11, 2018

December 6, 2019
December 6, 2019

April 22, 2018

December 6, 2019

December 18, 2018

December 13, 2018
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TABLE 2: ROUNDTABLES
Type
Investor/Asset Manager/
Proxy Advisory

Corporate Executive

Law Firm

Standard Setting & Rating Agency
NGO/Nonprofit

Firm/Entity Name
State Street Global Advisors
SASB
BlackRock, Inc.
JANA Partners
Glass Lewis & Co.
Goldman Sachs
Clorox
Goodyear
Levi Strauss & Co.
Lyft
Salesforce
Snap
Uber
Nestle Global
PepsiCo
Wells Fargo
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz LLP
Morrison & Foerster LLP
Linklaters LLP
SASB
TruValue Labs
The UN Global Compact

Sources: Blackrock CEO Letter Roundtable on November 8, 2019 and the SASBBerkeley Roundtable on Sustainability as Risk Prevention in Corporate Law on
December 6, 2019.
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TABLE 3: ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS IN SYMPOSIA
Type
Investor/Asset Manager/Proxy
Advisor

Corporate Executive

Standard Setting & Rating
Agency
NGO/Nonprofit

Firm/Entity Name
Boston Common Asset Management
Generation Investment Capital
JANA Partners
Soros Fund Management
The Boston Company Asset Management
Parnassus Investments
PJT Camberview
Newton Investment Management
Charles Schwab Investment Management
Generation Investment Management
Hermes EOS
Voleon Capital Management
BNY Mellon
Cisco
Checkr
Chevron Corporation
First Republic Bank
Levi Strauss & Co.
Nevro
PepsiCo
Wells Fargo Social Impact Investing
IdealRatings
Amnesty International
Association of Corporate Counsel
Bay Area Impact Investing Initiative
CECP Strategic Investor Initiative
Ceres
Kapor Center for Social Impact
Society for Corporate Governance
SustainAbility

